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Zhaojun Xu, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska, 2012
Adviser: Karl D. Hostetler
In this dissertation, the teaching of happiness through morality courses in
Mainland China is explored. The exploration centers on three questions: 1) What
should be taught to students in terms of happiness? 2) Should schools focus on the
cultivation of voluntary virtue or habituation of virtuous actions? And 3) what is the
relation between happiness and achievement and/or sacrifice of self-interest? Based
on both Aristotle’s and Marx’s views on these questions, the author argues that a
comprehensive rather than a “correct” understanding of happiness should be taught to
the students. Also, the author suggests that the goal of habituating students to virtuous
actions is to cultivate voluntary virtue in students, and the habituation itself should not
be the ultimate goal of moral education. Finally, the author suggests that in order to
contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of happiness, students should be
taught how to properly advance self-interest rather than always oppressing the
concern of self-interest.
The structure of this dissertation is as follows:
The research purpose and core issues are discussed in the Introduction. Chapter 1
is a background knowledge of the teaching of happiness in Mainland China and a
literature review on this topic. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus on Aristotle’s and
Marx’s views of happiness, respectively. In Chapter 4 Aristotle’s and Marx’s views of

	
  

happiness are compared and discussed. Chapter 5 focuses on the implications of both
the two philosophers’ views of happiness for the teaching practice of happiness in
Mainland China. Chapter 6 is the conclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I explore the teaching of happiness in Mainland China, in
light of both Aristotle and Marx. In the Chinese context, the understanding of
happiness is generally based on a Marxist view, while the teaching practice is also
constrained by the government within the Marxist framework. Also, some Confucian
virtues are integrated into morality course in Mainland China. Based on comparison
and analyses on both Marx’s and Aristotle’s views on happiness, Confucius’ views if
necessary, a better understanding of the philosophical foundation of happiness is
established in the dissertation. Hopefully, a better understanding of happiness will
contribute to a better practice of the teaching of happiness in Mainland China.
In Mainland China, moral education, or education in morality, is a particular
form of education dealing with students’ moral development. Generally, moral
education in Mainland China deals with the cultivation of the “correct” values and
virtues in students. Moral education is applied as a particular subject matter as is
mathematics and Chinese, which are all compulsory courses for students to take.
Morality courses are provided from elementary school through graduate school, but
the titles of morality courses vary.
Since the 1990s, happiness has been included as an important content in morality
courses in Mainland China. Certain chapters in different morality textbooks are
devoted to teach students how to be a happy person. Happiness is officially
interpreted as a certain kind of life only existing in a socialist or communist society;
and only in a communist society can perfect happiness for all be achieved. Students
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are taught that in a communist society, everyone’s needs and desires are satisfied, and
everyone can fully develop his or her talents. As a result, people in a communist
society lack nothing and are perfectly happy. In addition, happiness is connected with
virtuous behaviors in morality courses. That is, students are taught that happiness is
the outcome of certain virtues such as helping others and devoting oneself to
collectivism. Students are taught that by exercising certain virtues, they will achieve
happiness. For example, Chinese students are also taught that they should always
sacrifice self-interest for common interest; this sacrifice is imposed on the students as
a noble and virtuous action, which would definitely lead to happiness. At the same
time, the concern of self-interest is viewed as selfishness or egoism. All these
educational practices regarding the teaching of happiness represent a philosophical
foundation of happiness in Mainland China, but this philosophical foundation has
seldom been explored there.
1. Purpose and Core Questions
The Chinese government has demonstrated its increasing emphasis on the
teaching of happiness since decades ago. In order to properly teach happiness in
Mainland China, several fundamental questions regarding happiness should be fully
discussed or at least be considered by Chinese scholars and educators. For instance,
“What is happiness?” “What contributes to a happy life?” “How can happiness be
achieved?” “Can we really teach people to be happy?” “If we can, by what means?”
In the Chinese context, the government has regulated answers to these fundamental
questions, not only in school settings but also in education research. The only “correct”
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interpretations and principles of happiness, the Marxist view of happiness, are taught
as irrefutable truth to students. Questioning such truths is not encouraged or even
allowed by the Chinese government. As a result, these fundamental questions
regarding happiness have not been fully discussed, or even discussed at all, due to the
government’s ideological control. Other views on happiness besides the Marxist view
have rarely been introduced to Mainland China. Research of happiness (some other
humanity topics as well) has largely been constrained within the Marxist framework
by the government.
However, in order to teach happiness, investigation into these fundamental
questions is necessary. It helps us Chinese educators establish a better philosophical
foundation for the teaching of happiness and morality. The lack of such a foundation
may, and has, caused problems in the teaching practice in Mainland China. For
instance, in educational practice, schools put more stress on habituating students to
virtuous actions rather than cultivating voluntary virtue in students. That is, whether
or not students voluntarily exercise certain virtues has been neglected or even
discouraged, as long as students exercise those virtues in schools and outside of
school. This neglect or ignorance may be due to the fact that virtuous actions are
easier to observe than virtue itself, because invisible virtue is generally demonstrated
through humans’ behaviors. This neglect or ignorance implies that the Chinese
government tends to believe that habituation makes people accustomed to virtues and
finally possess virtues. However, the Chinese government has never justified this
argument that habituation of virtuous actions results in virtuous persons. In contrast,

	
  

	
  
	
  

voluntariness is an important concept in many ethicists’ theories, such as Aristotle.
Aristotle advocates habituation or character training seemingly similar to the Chinese
government, but he also emphasizes the importance of voluntariness in a virtuous
action. Without a sufficient exploration on happiness, how would we Chinese
educators know that we are doing the right thing? In this sense, it is necessary for us
Chinese educators to delve into the fundamental questions of happiness, in order to
improve our teaching practice.
As a scholar from Mainland China, I am fortunate to have the opportunity to go
beyond, at least to some degree, the constraint of a Marxist framework to explore the
philosophical foundation of happiness. In this dissertation, I focus on three basic
topics regarding happiness, based on my observation and personal experience of the
teaching of happiness, and research review on this issue in Mainland China.
a) What is happiness?
b) What is the significance of voluntariness in virtues, which may lead to
happiness?
c) What is the relation between happiness and the achievement/sacrifice of
self-interest?
The first question is the most basic question about happiness. It may be difficult
to provide a universally acceptable definition of happiness; different philosophers
disagree with each other in their definition of happiness. However, by comparing and
analyzing different definitions of happiness, we may gain some legitimate
understanding of the nature of happiness. This nature, though that still could be
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abstract, and difficult to be elucidated to students, will help us establish a
philosophical basis for the teaching of happiness in Mainland China. Different
definitions or identification of happiness, besides the Marxist view, Aristotle’s in
particular, would contribute to a full understanding of happiness in Mainland China.
Without such an understanding of happiness, how could we Chinese educators say we
know about happiness? If we do not understand it as we assume, based on what
philosophical foundation should we teach happiness to students?
In addition, to let the student know what is happiness is not the only goal of the
teaching of happiness. As suggested by the Chinese government, the ultimate purpose
of the teaching of happiness is to help students achieve happiness in their lives. In this
sense, we should also find out ways to achieve happiness, when we explore “What is
happiness?” For instance, according to the Chinese government, devoting oneself to
collectivism always leads to happiness. We need to think it over, “It that true?” and
“why or why not? We also need to figure out, “What contributes to happiness?” The
investigation in “What contributes to happiness” would justify or oppose some of our
Chinese teaching practice.
The second and third questions, the voluntary virtue and achievement/sacrifice of
self-interest, are both questions connected to happiness. The “correct” or tacitly
understood answers to them imposed by the Chinese government may not be the best
or even good answers. For instance, can we really cultivate generosity, benevolence,
and fraternal love in students through forced, involuntary donation, as the government
expects? Is the concern of self-interest always be bad, as it has been taught in
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Mainland China? Why and why not? Is it possible that sometimes the concern of
self-interest contributes to the realization of common interest rather than being
detrimental to it? Fixed answers to these questions provided or suggested by the
Chinese government may hinder educational practice there.
In summary, this dissertation centers on the philosophical foundation of the
teaching of happiness in Mainland China. By analyzing both Marx’s and Aristotle’s
views on the three issues of happiness, this dissertation provides different perspectives
other than the Marxist one to view the teaching of happiness in Mainland China. The
ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to improve the teaching practice of happiness
in Mainland China, even to the least degree.
2. Procedure and Methods
My analysis of happiness involves both Karl Marx’s and Aristotle’s works. For
the former, the reason is obvious: the teaching of happiness in Chinese schools is
based on Marxism. As a result, Marx’s works cannot be neglected if one decides to
investigate moral education in Mainland China. Also, Marxism is modified and
localized by the government; the Marxist view in Mainland China may not represent
Marx’s own view. As a result, it necessary for me to explore Marx’s own writings on
morality. Karl Marx seldom writes on either virtue or happiness as a particular topic,
because he is not at all a virtue ethicist as Aristotle is. However, in his works, he still
has left us some thoughts relevant to happiness. For instance, he writes about what the
unhappy life of workers of his time is like and what the reason for this unhappy life is.
In addition, Marx pays attention to both voluntary labor and self-interest, though
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through the lens of economics or sociology rather than ethics directly.
In this dissertation, I concentrate on the following works of Marx, although his
thoughts about happiness are not limited to them: Manifesto (1848), Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (1844), The German Ideology (1845-1846), The
Holy Family (1845), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (1906), and Critique of
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843). One thing that needs to be clarified is that
although the dominant ideology in China is mainly based on Marx, not all of his
arguments are taken by the Chinese government. For instance, Marx’s rejection of
morality is not taken into the Marxist view of morality in Mainland China1. Also, the
Chinese government may demonstrate a misunderstanding of some of Marx’s own
view.
I select Aristotle’s works, because he is one the most influential philosophers of
virtue ethics. His discussion about happiness, which was written almost 2400 years
ago, still nourishes many contemporary philosophers’ thinking. Moreover, the
“correct” principle that happiness derives from morality, which is taught in Mainland
China, is consistent to some extent with Aristotle’s argument that happiness is the
outcome of acting in accordance with virtue. Besides, Chinese schools apply
habituation as a means of virtue training, which is also suggested by Aristotle as a
necessary way to cultivate moral virtue. In addition, regarding the three questions of
happiness that are the focus of this dissertation, Aristotle demonstrates views different
from Marx. Aristotle’s views may inspire us Chinese educators to go beyond the
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Marxist framework and to conceive happiness from different perspectives. I select
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics as the main sources of his view on
happiness. The former is Aristotle’s most influential book on ethics, also on happiness
in particular; the latter, though it is not a treatise on ethics directly, provides many
important arguments regarding happiness. This book centers on how to properly
constitute a state so that the people can have happy lives.
My dissertation is composed of six chapters.
Chapter 1 is the background information and literature review of the teaching of
happiness in Mainland China. A brief history of moral education in Mainland China is
provided; it helps readers have a broad sense of how the Chinese government shapes
students’ morality through moral education. Also, Chapter 1 focuses on what the
“correct” Marxist view of happiness is in Mainland China, and how it is taught there.
Examples of the teaching of happiness are provided. Based on the outline of how
happiness is being taught in Mainland China, the literature review on this topic is also
provided in Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 explores Aristotle’ view of happiness. The previously stated three core
questions are discussed. Aristotle’s arguments on happiness, cultivation of voluntary
virtue, and self-interest are analyzed. Following the same line of core questions,
Chapter 3 focuses on Marx’s views on these issues. Agreement and disagreement
between both Aristotle’s and Marx’s views on happiness are compared and analyzed
in Chapter 4. Based on the comparison between the two philosophers’ views, my own
arguments on these three issues are also provided in this chapter.
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Chapter 5 centers on the implications for the teaching of happiness in Mainland
China based on the analysis in Chapter 4. It suggests other ways other than the
dominant Marxist one to conceive and even to improve the teaching of happiness in
Mainland China. Chapter 6 is the conclusion. It provides a summary of my entire
dissertation; also, it suggests some further potential research questions.
The last thing that I would like to articulate in this introduction is my personal
stance in this dissertation. As a scholar, I believe that there is a connection between
happiness and morality. Also, I believe if schools teach morality or virtue, regardless
of how they deal with it, either through hidden curriculum or through an independent
subject matter as Chinese schools do, or any other ways, the teaching of morality
should contribute to human well-being. However, moral education in Mainland China,
to a great extent, fails to achieve this goal. That is, the way that happiness has been
taught in Mainland China - basically through rote memorizing and rigid habituating fails to build in students a broad understanding of happiness. Also, it fails to cultivate
voluntary virtues in students, and these virtues, according to the government, should
lead to students’ happiness.
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
In this dissertation, discussions on moral education involve schools and
institutions only in Mainland China. Taiwan, although according to the Chinese
government is a province of China, is an independent country. Moral education in
Taiwan has some similarities as that in Mainland China, for instance the influence of
Confucian tradition. However, Taiwan has a different educational system, and
Marxism has never been the dominant philosophical foundation there. Hong Kong
and Macao, as “Special Administrative Regions” of China, both have moral education
distinct from Mainland China due to their long colonial history and different
educational systems.
1. An Overview of Moral Education in Mainland China
a) The Confucian tradition of moral education in the ancient China
Moral education, as a particular form of education, has a long history in
Mainland China. In general, Confucianism was the most influential philosophy in
China from 134 B. C. to 1895. During this period of time, moral education was based
on Confucianism, which emphasizes character training and virtue cultivation. For
Confucius, the ultimate purpose of education is to establish a perfect state organized
by “rules of proprieties (li, in Confucius’ words).” As a result, Confucius suggests that
everyone should learn all the “rules of properties,” such as benevolence, filial piety,
righteousness, and so on, in order to establish such a state. For Confucius, everyone
should learn moral principles to become ideal persons, or “junzi” in his words. An
ideal person, according to Confucius, is the one who lives in a way “to illustrate
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illustrious virtue, to renovate the people, and to rest in the highest excellence” (The
Great Leaning, 1). Also, Confucius believes that ideal persons or “jun zi” contribute
to the constitution of a perfect state.
In order to become an ideal person, Confucius suggests that one should start
from cultivating oneself with knowledge and virtues. According to Confucius, the
most important virtues are Ren and Li. Ren generally refers to benevolence, which is
seen by many Confucian commentators as the “fundamental virtue of all other virtues”
in Confucian ethics (Liu, 2004, p. 114). Li refers to a series of moral principles based
on Ren; for Confucius, Li are established by the sage and should be followed by
average people to achieve Ren. Confucians identify some other particular virtues as
variables of both Ren and Li, such as loving the people, filial piety, and respectfulness
(Confucian virtues are not limited to this list). For Confucius, once a person possesses
these virtues, he/she should regulate him/her behavior with them. Then he/she should
move on to apply these virtues to regulate his/her family, and then to govern the state,
and finally to achieve the perfect state, which is “tranquil and happy” (Li Ji, li yun).
Although Confucianism is no longer the dominant ideology in Mainland China, many
Confucian virtues have been integrated into current moral education to inculcate good
citizenship and characters in students.
b) Moral education based on Marxism in Mainland China
In the early 1900s, Marxism was introduced to China. When the Communist
Party of China began to gain the power in the early 1920s, communism gradually
replaced Confucianism and became the dominant ideology in Mainland China. This
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replacement is also demonstrated through changes in moral education. With decades
of curriculum re-design, moral education in Mainland China becomes an independent
subject matter, which is based on Marxism. According to the Chinese government,
moral education, together with intellectual, physical, artistic, and labor (working) skill
education (Five Education, or wu yu in Chinese), may produce qualified and virtuous
socialist citizens, and in turn, will lead to a harmonious and prosperous
socialist/communist nation. Moral education, according to the government, is the
most important among these five areas of education.
The main goal of moral education in Mainland China is to shape students’
socialist/communist morality and to prepare them to be qualified “socialist/communist
Successors. According to the government, socialist/communist successors should
possess the Four Must-Have Qualities: communist ideals, communist morality,
knowledge, and discipline. Regarding the content of moral education, the Chinese
government determines what is taught through morality courses and how. For instance,
the government censors morality textbooks to make sure only the “correct” morality
(socialist/communist morality) is taught to students. In general, the “correct”
socialist/communist morality is claimed by the government to be based on Marxism,
but this Marxist view of morality may not be the authentic view of Marx. That is, the
Chinese government, more or less, distorts and localizes Marx’s own view on
morality and society.
In addition, the government applies several means to arouse students’ serious
attention to morality. For instance, students’ memory and understanding of the
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“correct” morality is tested, and their moral performance is assessed and kept on
records by teachers. Records of students’ morality significantly affect their future
academic and professional development. Morality records have an important, if not
determinant, impact on the students’ future graduation, admission especially in
secondary and higher education levels, and their later employment in some sensitive
administrations or departments. Usually in order to have a good moral record, Chinese
students have to demonstrate a good memory of the “correct” morality in tests and to
perform virtuous actions in schools. In this way, students’ voluntariness in virtuous
actions is neglected or even ignored; I will return to voluntary virtue in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5.
2. An Outline of the Teaching of Happiness in Mainland China
According to the Chinese government, happiness is a certain kind of life that
only exists in a socialist/communist society. The Chinese government does not
provide a direct definition on happiness in morality textbooks, but based on all the
descriptions and analysis of the life in a communist society, the government tends to
convince students that everyone will have a happy life only in a communist society.
The Chinese government identifies current Chinese society as a socialist one, which is
a primary and temporary stage towards a communist society. According to the
government, since a socialist society is only at the primary stage of communism, not
all the people are having happy lives. However, a socialist society is still superior to
and better than any other societies, in terms of contributing to people’s happiness.
Students in Mainland China are expected by the government to have a “correct”
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(or the Marxist) view of happiness, which is tightly related to communism. As a result,
one of the most important and necessary contents to teach happiness is to teach
Marx’s ideas of communism to students across all educational levels. Students are
expected by the government to develop a “correct” view that happiness is inseparably
bound to communism. Also, students are expected to memorize and understand the
features or necessities of real happiness in a communist society, which includes
all-sided development, to distribute products according to people’s needs, and to
abolish private property.
In addition, students are taught that happiness can only be achieved by exercising
communist virtues2. For example, a chapter titled “To Be a ‘Happy Bird’” (in the
second grade morality textbook) focuses on the question “how to be a happy person?”
The text indicates that by helping others and devoting oneself to collectivism, one will
be happy. The chapter “We Are Happy: The Happiness of Sharing” (in the third grade
textbook) focus on the idea that by sharing one’s personal possession with others, one
makes others happy and in turn that person will be happy. Usually the
socialist/communist virtues are collectivism-oriented virtues, which emphasize the
absolute priority of collectivism over individuals. Universal virtues such as honesty
and kindness are also included in socialist/communist virtues, and these universal
virtues are usually taught in a collectivism-oriented context. The highest virtue that
leads to happiness, according to the Chinese government, is to dedicate oneself to
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   According	
  to	
  the	
  official	
  document,	
  communist	
  virtues	
  refers	
  to	
  virtues	
  mainly	
  based	
  on	
  Five	
  Loves,	
  which	
  
includes	
  a	
  love	
  for	
  the	
  country,	
  the	
  people,	
  labor,	
  science,	
  socialists/communist	
  (In	
  Mainland	
  China,	
  a	
  socialist	
  is	
  
purposed	
  as	
  the	
  primary	
  stage	
  of	
  a	
  communist	
  society,	
  as	
  a	
  result,	
  socialist	
  and	
  communist	
  are	
  essentially	
  
synonyms	
  in	
  the	
  Chinese	
  context).	
  For	
  instance,	
  one’s	
  loyalty	
  to	
  the	
  country	
  and	
  the	
  Communist	
  party	
  is	
  an	
  
important	
  and	
  necessary	
  virtue	
  for	
  every	
  citizen	
  in	
  Mainland	
  China.	
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communism.
In Mainland China, different educational levels have different emphases in moral
education. So it is in the teaching of happiness. In general, primary level moral
education focuses on good habit training rather than learning theory; at secondary and
higher educational levels, more Marxist theories are taught to students. Across all
educational levels, students’ political “correctness” in their views of happiness, that is,
their beliefs in communism as the premise of happiness, is shaped and emphasized.
Besides morality courses, this “correctness” is also stressed through
collectivism-oriented activities in schools. Students' active involvement in these
activities is an important part of their morality performance to be recorded by
teachers. For instance, students are compelled to apply to join the Young Pioneers in
junior high and apply to join the Communist Party in high school. Those whose
applications get approved are praised and honored, while the last-approved or even
denied students are usually labeled “trouble-maker students.”
Besides communist virtue, the teaching of happiness in Mainland China also
integrates some Confucian virtue. For instance, harmony, as a Confucian virtue, is
integrated as an important component of happiness, although Marx himself hardly
demonstrates enthusiasm for this particular virtue. That is to say, in the Chinese
context, happiness implies harmony in a broad sense, such as harmony between
individuals and collectivism, individuals and individuals, and harmony between the
nature and human beings. Among all these relations, harmony between individuals
and collectivism is the most important one, according to the Chinese government.
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Students are taught that the primary principle to deal with the relation between
individuals and collectivism is to always give the priority to the collectivism and
always be ready to sacrifice interest in self for the interest of collectivism (common
interest). In this sense, sacrifice of self-interest is conceived as socialist/communist
virtue. In contrast, concern for self-interest is generally viewed as a synonym of
egoism or selfishness in the Chinese context, which is extremely detrimental to
communism, according to the government. As a result, students are taught that they
should oppress their concern for self-interest and only concern for common interest.
In this way, everyone can dedicate oneself to collectivism, and so to communism;
finally all the people will achieve happiness.
In summary, in Mainland China, moral education refers to a particular subject
matter, which deals with students’ socialist/communist morality development.
Happiness becomes an important content of moral education in Mainland China in
recent decades. The teaching of happiness in Mainland China can be summarized as
the following points:
a) Happiness is a certain kind of life that only can be achieved in a
socialist/communist society.
b) In order to achieve happiness, one should follow the socialist/communist
virtues, which emphasize one’s dedication to the collectivism and communism.
c) The teaching of happiness is also based on the assessment of students’
memory of socialist/communist morality and virtuous performance in school. As a
result, students’ voluntariness in these virtuous actions is neglected or ignored.
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d) Self-interest is generally conceived as something opposite to communism and
real happiness; consequently, for the sake of harmony students should oppress their
concern for self-interest and only concern for common interest.
3. Literature Review on the Teaching of Happiness in Mainland China
a) Research on the Teaching of Happiness Published in Mainland China
In the recent decades, the amount of research on the teaching of happiness in
Mainland China has increased, as a result of the government’s propaganda of its
political goal “to constitute a harmony and happy society.” For researches that are
published in Mainland China, they are generally under the ideological constraint of
the government. As a result, these researches are conducted within the Marxist
framework. In general, the philosophical basis for these research studies are that the
Marxist view of happiness is the only “correct” view that should be taught to students
and should contribute students’ happy lives.
For instance, Meng (2010) argues that the teaching of happiness (“happiness
education” in his words) should focus on emancipation of human beings, free labor,
and humans’ all-round development. Meng’s argument on these three aspects of
happiness education is based on Marxist arguments on human emancipation, labor,
and humans’ full development in a communist society. Hou (2008) compares different
ideas on “happiness education,” and she proposes that real happiness is always related
to “constraint, regulation, sacrifice, and devotion,” which are typical
socialist/communist virtues contributing to happiness imposed on students by the
Chinese government. Zhu and Cao (2007) argue that students should develop a
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scientific sense of happiness. This scientific sense of happiness refers to a view of
happiness, based on both Marxism and Marxist ideas developed by the Chinese
Leaders such as Deng, Jiang, and Hu. He (2006) proposes that the real happiness is to
be rational and to have a valuable life. When describing what a valuable life is, He
(2006) defines it is a life in which one constantly “develops one’s ego and to uplift the
value of being a human.” This conception of a valuable life, according to He, is based
on the Marxist concept of self-realization. Wang, Shen, and He (2004) and Xu (2004)
focus on how to effectively foster communist morality in students and how to teach
them the “correct” political beliefs or values that will contribute to their future lives.
Although the Chinese government favors research studies within the framework
of Marxism, Chinese researchers have also include other philosophical views in their
writing. However, the purpose of the inclusion of different views besides Marxism is
to compare, to criticize, and to integrate reasonable content of other views to enrich
the Marxist view. For instance, two nationally influential textbooks on moral
education, Chen’s (2006) On Chinese Moral Education and Huang’s (2008) The
Reform of Chinese Moral Education in the Process of Values Transition, both
introduce philosophies other than Marxism but treat them as potential theories to
perfect Marxism. Hou (2008) quotes Aristotle’s idea that happiness should be
associated with virtue, but in Hou’s argument, virtue refers to socialist/communist
virtue in particular, which is different from Aristotle. Weiyong (2008) criticizes
post-modern views of happiness, which according to her emphasize instant pleasures.
Weiyong suggest that moral education in Mainland China should focus on the
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“correct” view of happiness to encounter the challenges from “incorrect” views.
To summarize, the researches on happiness published in Mainland China are
largely under the ideological control of the government. Few researches go beyond
the Marxist view of happiness, which is taught as the only “correct” view of
happiness in Mainland China. Rather than challenging the only “correct” view, many
researches focus on how to teach it well in schools. Research on voluntary virtue and
self-interest published in Mainland China are rarely found. The two topics may be
sensitive in the Chinese context. For instance, by stressing voluntary virtue, one may
imply that moral education in Mainland China fails to cultivate voluntary virtue. This
implication is a direct challenge of the authority and correctness of moral education in
Mainland China. Also, in the Chinese collectivism-oriented context, attempting to
justify self-interest is dangerous, which may be labeled individualism and incorrect.
As a result, research on the teaching of self-interest is also lacking in Mainland China.
b) Research on the Teaching of Happiness or Morality that Are Not under
the Government’s Constraint
Sometimes Chinese researchers have opportunities to publish their studies in
foreign journals that are out of the ideological control of the government. However,
these researchers still try to avoid directly challenging the “correctness” of the
Marxist view of happiness or morality in Mainland China. Also, they avoid directly
criticizing the ideological indoctrination through moral education. A good example is
Lian’s (1980) “Moral Education in New China,” which is written in English and
published in International Review of Education. In this article, the author applied a
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descriptive method in explaining what and how Communist morality is taught in
Chinese schools. Lian (1980) attempts to hold a neutral stance towards the
Communist-value-indoctrination programs, even if he said he was not supportive to
them, this was apparent in his wording. A possible reason for this avoidance of direct
criticism is that the Chinese researchers may possess positions in institutions of
Mainland China, and their publications are still under that constraint of “political
correctness” of the government. They do not want to challenge the authoritative
ideology to endanger their positions.
On the other hand, for those research studies published outside of Mainland
China, they are usually carried out by independent researchers who are not concerned
for Chinese government’s censorship. These research studies can cross the ideology
barrier and directly criticize moral education in Mainland China. For instance, Bass
(2005) criticizes that moral education in Tibet China has attempted to gradually twist
native students’ ethnic identities, which is detrimental to students’ future happiness.
Bass argues that moral education in Tibet not only fails to contribute to students’
happiness but also has negative influence on it. Cheung and Pan (2006) also offer
works examining the outcomes of moral education in Mainland China. They argue
that the Chinese government has failed to exclude individualism from students
through its collectivism-oriented moral education. They find that “regulated
individualism” and “gradual but conditional liberalization” has partly replaced
traditional collectivism from Mao’s time, and they both have affected students’
morality, students’ attitude towards individualism and collectivism in particular. For
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instance, students may have more concern for individual happiness rather than the
happiness of the society. Hawkins, Zhou, and Lee (2001) analyze the content changes
of moral education in Mainland China, and they argue that the Chinese government
has struggled to balance between the collectivism and the individualism in morality
courses.
These research studies by outsiders contribute to a holistic understanding of
moral education in Mainland China. Nevertheless, probably due to their perspectives
as outsiders, they do not demonstrate a full knowledge of what and how morality,
happiness in particular, has been and is taught in Mainland China. For example, Bass
(2005) focuses on the Tibet area where an ethnic minority resides; education there
could be slightly or greatly different from other areas of Mainland China. Moral
education in Tibet may not be sufficiently representative of the general situation in
Mainland China. Cheung and Pan’s (2006) analyses are based on governmental
instruction menus, which may not fully indicate the reality of moral education
practices. Similarly, Hawkins, Zhou, and Lee’s (2001) research results of moral
education in Mainland China are based on a survey of sampling leaders in the field of
values education. Their results manifest only the leaders’ views and may be slightly or
greatly different to that of the general public, parents, and the students. To summarize,
rare outside researchers fully explore the teaching of happiness in Mainland China,
though they can go beyond the government’s constraints.
Based on the literature review, I find that there exists little critical exploration
regarding how happiness has been taught in Mainland China. For native Chinese
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scholars, they have to consider the government’s tolerance for their research topics.
Consequently, they tend not to directly challenge or criticize moral education, and
their research studies hardly go beyond the Marxist framework. At the same time,
researchers outside of China may freely express their critical and challenging attitude
toward Chinese moral education. However, these scholars may be insufficiently
familiar with the details of moral education in Mainland China, and their criticism is
usually from disciplines like anthropology, sociology, or educational administration,
rather than ethics. Regarding the teaching of happiness in moral education in
Mainland China, the three core questions of this dissertation in particular,
investigation is lacking. These questions will be addressed in this dissertation, and
hopefully exploration of these questions will contribute to a better practice of teaching
happiness in Mainland China.
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CHAPTER 2: ARISTOTLE’S VIEW OF HAPPINESS
Aristotle’s view of happiness is one of the most influential philosophical
thinking regarding happiness and has significantly affected many modern ethicists.
About 2500 years ago, Aristotle addressed basic questions regarding happiness, such
as “What is happiness?” and “How can a person achieve happiness?” His analyses of
happiness also cover issues of voluntariness and self-interest, two important concepts
related to happiness.
1. Aristotle’s Conception of Happiness
Aristotle’s arguments on the concept of happiness can be summarized as follows:
a) Happiness is the highest and final good; people pursue happiness for its own
sake.
b) Happiness is a certain kind of life; it means to live well and do well.
c) Happiness is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.
d) Happiness has embraced many different kinds of good, it involves not only
good for individuals but also good for others.
First of all, Aristotle’s conception of happiness is based on his argument on
“What is good?” For Aristotle, the term “good” has as many senses as being, so “there
could not be a common Idea set over all these goods” (NE, Book I). For instance,
Aristotle identifies different goods in the following cases:
… it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of
reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which
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is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right
opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like. (NE, Book
I)
Aristotle argues that good could exist in substance, quality, quantity, relation,
time and place. For instance, Aristotle believes that God is good; this is good in
substance. Bravery is also a particular kind of good, which is in the category of virtue.
A knife may useful tool a person, then, it is a particular good in relation. For Aristotle,
there are many kinds of good; consequently, good cannot, or at least is difficult to, be
generalized as something universal. However, Aristotle still insists that there is a
“single Form” good that “other goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are
called “good by reference to [it]” (NE, Book I). Aristotle believes that happiness is
this “single Form” good, or the “chief good” or “final good” in his words.
Aristotle states:
Now such a thing [a particular good] happiness, above all else, is held to
be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of
something else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose
indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still
choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness,
judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other
hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything
other than itself. (NE, Book I)
For Aristotle, happiness is good in itself and persons pursue this good for its own
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sake. In contrast to happiness, other goods are pursued and loved by people for
something else rather than these goods themselves. For instance, delicious food is
good for people, but people pursue delicious food not only for the food itself but also
for something else such as health, taste, and the pleasure of enjoying the food.
Aristotle believes that many things like food, though they may be good for people, are
good in the “secondary sense,” because these things tend to produce or to preserve the
final good or to prevent something contrary to it (NE, Book I).
In addition, Aristotle identifies happiness as “a certain kind of life,” as “living
well and doing well” (NE, Book I). Then, the question is, for Aristotle, what does it
mean to live well and to do well? Aristotle believes that it means to act in accordance
with virtue. This argument is based on Aristotle’s conception of a person’s function in
a state.
Aristotle states:
… we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be
an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the
function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these,
and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance
with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to
be activity of soul in accordance with virtue… (NE, Book I)
Aristotle believes that for all things that have a function or activity, the good and
the “well” resides in the function; consequently, man’s good resides in man’s function.
According to Aristotle, the function of man is to live well and to do well. Also, he
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believes that in order to live well and to do well, one needs to follow rational
principles. Since for Aristotle, following rational principles represents man’s
excellence or virtue, which according to Aristotle is “the state of character which
makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well” (NE, Book II). In
this way, Aristotle states that happiness is the highest good or excellence of people,
which is a “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” (NE, Book I). For Aristotle,
moral virtue can be learned and cultivated in people through habit training. He says,
“happiness seems, [to me,] comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or
training” (NE, Book I). In this sense, Aristotle believes that happiness comes as a
result of virtue habit training.
Finally, for Aristotle, happiness is self-sufficient; it has embraced many other
kinds of good. As a result, people cannot make happiness better by adding something
good to it.
Aristotle states:
… the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes
life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be;
and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted
as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be
made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that
which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is
always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and
self-sufficient, and is the end of action (NE, Book I).
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For Aristotle, in order to be happy, one needs at least some materials such as
food, clothes, shelter, and so forth, because “no man can live well, or indeed live at all,
unless he be provided with necessaries” (Politics, Book I, Part IV). This implies that
for Aristotle, happiness has at least embraced some other goods such as necessary or
possession or property. In general, these necessities enable a person to maintain his or
her own life and to act in accordance with virtue. Otherwise, how could a starving and
dying person act virtuously, if he or she can barely act at all? Aristotle states, “… a
poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means with which to spend
large sums fittingly” (NE, Book IV). For Aristotle, necessary material conditions
contribute to virtue, and in turn contribute to happiness. So, Aristotle suggests, “of the
remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and
others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments” (NE, Book I).
Besides embracing many other kinds of good, happiness, according to Aristotle,
should embrace both an individual’s happiness and others’ happiness. He says:
… for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient
we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who
lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for
his friends and fellow citizens… (Nicomachean Ethics, Book I).
This quotation demonstrates that in light of Aristotle, happiness is not an issue of
only an individual; instead, other people such as an individual’s parents, children,
neighbors, and the entire society must be considered. For Aristotle, happiness must
involve not only different kinds of good such as wealth or health but also the goods
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for both others and oneself. That is to say, Aristotle conceives happiness in a
comprehensive way; in this sense, happiness embraces all kinds of good and persons,
and it is self-sufficient and lacking of nothing.
2. Aristotle’s View of Voluntary Action and Involuntary Action
As a virtue ethicist, Aristotle insists that moral virtue can be a result of virtue
habituation. The emphasis on habitation does not suggest that Aristotle only pay
attention to the inculcation of virtuous action, although habit training is usually based
on people’s overt behaviors. Aristotle notices that sometimes people may apply an
action involuntarily, and he believes that voluntarily virtuous actions are better than
involuntarily ones. Based on Aristotle’s argument regarding voluntary and
involuntary, the following three points are noticeable:
a) For Aristotle, voluntary actions involve deliberation, while involuntary actions
do not.
b) According to Aristotle, voluntary actions are moved by a “moving principle in
a man,” while involuntary actions are moved by “moving principles in abstract.”
c) When considering whether an action voluntary or not, Aristotle suggests that
one should always refer to the moment of that action.
Let’s unpack these arguments in detail.
First of all, Aristotle distinguishes voluntary actions from involuntary ones.
Aristotle argues that a voluntary action is an action done based on an agent’s
deliberation. According to Aristotle, “Not every class of men deliberates about the
things that can be done by their own efforts” (NE, Book II). This idea is consistent
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with Aristotle’s argument on different classes and their different capacities and
functions in a state. For instance, common people and slaves either do not deliberate
at all, or they do not deliberate as the philosophers do, because common people and
slaves do not have sufficient wisdom. That is the reason why common people and
slaves need the philosophers to teach them rational principles or to tell them what to
do, according to Aristotle. In addition, Aristotle believes that this deliberation is “not
about ends but about means” (NE, Book II). Aristotle believes that deliberation is to
consider possible means to a certain end and to select the appropriate means. For
instance, Aristotle argues that a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, but
through what means he can heal a patient. Through deliberation, the doctor selects a
treatment and applies it to the patient. The selecting and application of the treatment,
according to Aristotle, is a voluntary action. On the contrary, if due to ignorance, the
doctor randomly selects a treatment, then in Aristotle’ view, the doctor’s action is
involuntary, because this actions is not based on deliberation.
However, Aristotle’s view on whether an action is voluntary or not is very
complicated. He provides some exceptional cases, which at first sight look
involuntary, but are identified as voluntary by Aristotle. For instance, Aristotle
suggests that a tyrant’s forcing someone to do something base through the threat of
killing his family is a voluntary case. That is, for Aristotle, if the person finally does
the base thing, he or she does it voluntarily. The action of doing the base thing seems
to be involuntary at first sight, because this person would not do it without external
force from the tyrant. Nevertheless, Aristotle tends to identify it as voluntary, or in his
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words, “mixed, but [is] more like voluntary action[s]” (NE, Book II). That is, for
Aristotle this kind of action is most likely to be voluntary, but not necessarily. His
rationale is, to do the base thing is “worthy of choice at the time when [it] is done”
(NE, Book II). If we recall Aristotle’s argument that deliberation is not about end but
about means, his rationale may become easier to understand. If the end of one’s action
is to maintain virtue or noblity, then what one should deliberate on is how to best
achieve this end. However, in the tyrant’s case, the end is not only to maintain virtue,
but also a more urgent end, to secure one’s family. Since the end changes, then the
deliberation on the means should also change. To do the base thing, though it is
blameworthy, seems to this person the only means to save his or her family at that
moment. As a result, according to Aristotle, it is voluntary.
In addition, it seems to Aristotle that when a person acts involuntarily, that is, to
act without deliberation on why he or she acts in a certain way, this person is not
really moved by himself or herself. Instead, for Aristotle, it is like this person carried
by a wind. Aristotle identifies this situation as being moved by “moving principles in
the abstract” (NE, Book II). In Aristotle’s terms, “moving principles in the abstract” is
opposite to “moving principles in a man.” The former are the moving principles
shaped by factors outside of a man, while the latter are principles internalized in
man’s nature.
Aristotle states:
Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with
reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the
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principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is
in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself
are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary,
but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such
act in itself (NE, Book III).
According to Aristotle, a person feels compulsion to do something with these
outside principles, in which “ nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is
feeling the passion” (NE, Book III). For instance, when the ignorant doctor in the
previous case randomly selects a treatment, the doctor himself or herself contribute
nothing to this selection, compared to the case where a doctor deliberately selects that
same treatment. This ignorant doctor is being carried by something outside of
him/her, as a result, Aristotle believes this doctor acts involuntarily. Similarly,
Aristotle suggests that other people who can manipulate a person also belong to
outside principles. That is, if someone is threatened or manipulated by some powerful
people, and this person does something according to their commands, then this
person’s action is also involuntary.
However, based on Aristotle’s argument, it still may be still not so easy to
distinguish “moving principles in a man” from “moving principles in the abstract,”
because in practice things are very complicated and mixed. For instance, a person
may be moved by mixed moving principles to act in a certain way. Then the question
is, how to distinguish one principle from another? Or, can we really identify purely
internal or external principles, when everyone is affected by multiple factors,
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including both inward and outward? Since in many cases, the moving principles are a
combination of both, Aristotle himself calls this kind of actions mixed; also he says
that actions moved by principles in the abstract are only “perhaps” involuntary.
If we combine the doctor’s and the tyrant’s case together, we may find why
Aristotle calls some cases “mixed” regarding voluntary or involuntary. Supposed a
doctor should select a treatment to save a patient’s life, but the doctor is threatened by
a tyrant to let the patient die, otherwise the doctor’s family would be killed. If the
doctor finally withholds all treatments and lets the patient die, then in Aristotle’s
view, is the doctor’s withholding of treatment voluntary or involuntary? According to
Aristotle, voluntary actions are actions based on deliberation about the means. Based
on this argument, the doctor’s action is voluntary, because the doctor has to deliberate
on his situation and select a particular means. However, Aristotle also argues that
involuntary actions are those moved by “moving principles in the abstract” rather than
“moving principles in a man.” When we refer to this argument, the doctor’s action is
actually moved by an outside principle, which is a person in the power who can
manipulate the doctor. In this sense, the doctor’s actions should be identified as
involuntary.
According to Aristotle, it is difficult to identify voluntary and involuntary
actions, due to the complexity of humans’ nature and their lives. But one thing in
Aristotle’s arguments that we should keep in mind is that we should always refer to
“the moment of action” to judge whether an action is voluntary or involuntary. In the
doctor’s case, we may say that the doctor voluntarily saves his family by involuntarily
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letting the patient die. When referring to different ends and different means, we may
come to different conclusions about what is voluntary and what is not.
3. Aristotle’s View on Self-interest
Aristotle’s conception of self-interest is related to Aristotle’s argument on how to
manage a state. That is, Aristotle tends to believe that a good state is managed on a
private basis rather than a common one. That is, if everyone is properly concerned for
the interest in self and appropriately pursues self-interest, then personal lives and the
state are both good. Aristotle’s discussion on self-interest contains the following
points:
a) To act in one’s interest resides in humans’ nature; if not taken to an extreme,
self-interest is positive to people’s development.
b) Private property based on self-interest should be kept; while a society
managed on a common basis may be chaotic.
c) Self-interest is the basis for certain virtues such as generosity.
d) Selflessness in noble, but only few people can really give up concern for
self-interest and only look out for other’s interest.
First of all, Aristotle distinguishes self-interest from egoism. He believes that
unlike vicious egoism, self-interest, is necessary and positive in man’s development.
As Aristotle states, “… when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain
of one another, and they will make more progress, because everyone will be attending
to his own business” (Politics, Book II, Part V). For instance, when a person is
concerned for his or her health, which is generally in his or her own interest, this
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concern for self-interest may compel this person to improve his or her physical
condition. Consequently, this person may have only healthy food and do physical
exercises. With a better physical condition, this person may be more energetic to
participate in activities such as helping others. In this sense, self-interest could be very
positive and contributive to people’s development, both individuals and others.
However, excessive or exclusive concern for self-interest is close to egoism,
which Aristotle criticizes:
Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a
thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by
nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this,
however, is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess
(Politics, Book II, Part V).
For Aristotle, the feeling of having something of one’s own is pleasant. It is
determined by persons’ nature that they act for their own sake or to love themselves.
This love of self is the basis of one’s concern for interest in self. According to
Aristotle, when this love of self is excessive, one may become selfish. Selfishness or
egoism is beyond Aristotle’s definition of positive self-interest; the latter should be
encouraged but the former should be blamed.
Aristotle’s distinction between self-interest and selfishness is based on several
considerations. First of all, according to Aristotle, a defect or excess in certain
character are two vices for people. In this sense, since selfishness or egoism is the
excess of self-love, it should be “rightly censured” (Politics, Book II, Part V). In
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addition, for Aristotle, the proper self-love is not to gratify one’s own interest only.
Instead, proper self-love should also take into consideration others’ interests. As
Aristotle says, “… the good man acts for honor's sake, and the more so the better he is,
and acts for his friend's sake, and sacrifices his own interest” (NE, Book IX). That is,
Aristotle believes that a good person should first be a self-lover, but more important, a
good person acts for others’ sake as well. For example, if a person stays away from
danger, this person may be called a self-lover. But if this person, who is aware of the
danger to save a drowning stranger in a deep river but still exercises the noble action,
then this person is noble. He or she is noble because he or she sacrifices self-interest
for the stranger’s sake and/or honor’s sake rather than for anything else such as
rewards. In this sense, Aristotle suggests that to be concerned for and to act in
self-interest is natural, but to sacrifice self-interest in proper ways at proper times and
to act in others’ interests may make one noble. This point is central to Aristotle’s view
on self-interest.
Secondly, Aristotle tends to emphasize the conflict between self-interest and
common interest. His argument is based on his justification of private property, which
is generally based on self-interest. Aristotle argues that people must keep property
private, so that their rights, benefits, and responsibilities may be clear. He says,
“Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private”
(Politics, Book II, Part V). Aristotle’s rationale is that when everyone has a distinct
self-interest, he or she will focus on his or her own business and try to make progress
in oneself. Also, according to Aristotle, when one is focusing on one’s own business,

	
  

	
  
	
  

36	
  

people would not complain about each another. In contrast, Aristotle sees several
disadvantages of a state based on a common basis, where people frequently complain
about each other. Aristotle claims that “there is much more quarrelling among those
who have all things in common” than those who have private property (Politics, Book
II, Part V). One of the reasons for the quarrelling is, Aristotle suggests that it is
difficult to identify one’s particular responsibility or rights, since everyone shares
everything. For instance, should a wife clean all other peoples’ house, since it is also
this wife’s houses on the common basis? If this wife refuses to clean others’ houses,
should other wives still clean her house? It seems to Aristotle, a common basis may
cause this kind of confusion and make a state or family chaotic.
Thirdly, Aristotle insists that some virtue such as liberality is based on private
property. For instance, according to Aristotle, when a person has private property, he
or she can do liberal actions to help his friends, guests, or even strangers. This liberal
action involves the sacrifice of self-interest. In this sense, for Aristotle, virtues such as
liberality and generosity are based on self-interest. Without self-interest, these virtues
seem to lose their ethical basis. Also, according to Aristotle, evils such as selfishness
do not arise out of the possession of private property, but from “the weakness of
human nature” (Politics, Book II, Part V). That is to say, Aristotle does not believe
private property causes egoism; neither does he believe that the best way to eliminate
egoism is to abolish private property.
Finally, Aristotle believes that only very few people can look out for others’
interest without being concerned for their own interest. Aristotle calls this kind of
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person the self-sufficient man, who is “sufficient to himself and excels his subjects in
all good things” (NE, Book VIII). According to Aristotle, a self-sufficient person
“needs nothing further” and “will not look to his own interests but to those of his
subjects”. Aristotle argues that only the king of a state, rather than everyone, can be
self-sufficient and always looks to the advantages of his subjects.
To summarize, Aristotle believes self-interest can be positive to people’s progress.
However, excessive concern for self-interest leads to selfishness. Aristotle justifies
people’s concern and pursuits for self-interest, but criticizes selfishness. Also,
Aristotle tends to doubt the complete consistency between self-interest and common
interest. Rather, Aristotle believes that they generally conflict with each other. He
advocates private property and implies that it is a good way to protect self-interest.
Moreover, Aristotle believes that self-interest could be the basis of some particular
virtues such as liberality. Finally, he believes that only few people rather than all can
be really selfless and concerned for only interest of others.
4. Conclusion
Aristotle provides tremendous inspiring thoughts on happiness. First of all,
Aristotle believes that happiness is the highest good of human beings; it is an activity
of the soul in accordance with virtue. Secondly, Aristotle believes that voluntary
virtue contribute more to happiness rather than involuntary virtue. And he suggests
that voluntary virtue can be cultivated in people through habituation. Finally, Aristotle
states that concern of self-interest is positive in a person’s development; he also
insists that private property based on self-interest should be kept in order to constitute
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CHAPTER 3: MARX’S VIEW OF HAPPINESS
Marx is not at all a virtue ethicist; he seldom writes directly on happiness. For
Marx, happiness is not the most important thing to be considered for human beings.
There are some other dimensions in Marx’s writings, such as self-realization of
human essence, freedom, communism, which are at least equivalently important as
happiness, if not more important. Marx describes the unhappy or pathetic lives of
workers of his time; also he predicts a perfect life in a communist society. This
indirect writing on happiness is the main source for us to explore Marx’s view on
relevant issues of happiness. Also, Marx explores voluntary labor and self-interest in
his works, which is a valuable source for us to understand his view on both
voluntariness and self-interest.
1. Marx’s Conception of Happiness
Marx’s conception of happiness can be summarized as follows:
a) Happiness is a particular good but no higher than some other goods, such as
freedom and self-realization of human essence.
b) Private property and alienation cause unhappy lives, as a result, happiness can
only be achieved based on the abolishment of private property and alienation.
c) Happiness should also be based on sufficient materials or social products.
d) Happiness should include happiness of both individuals and others.
First of all, Marx tends to identify happiness as one of the highest goods for
human beings but not the only one. For instance, Marx criticizes that the aim of
industry in his time is “the possession of wealth”; and he argues that the aim of
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industry should be “happiness of men” (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844, p.10, EPM for short for the following discussion). In this sense, Marx believes
that happiness is not only important but also necessary for human beings. However,
For Marx, happiness, as important as it is, is not the highest or ultimate goal of human
beings. He never indicates that happiness is the only highest good of human society.
Marx’s conception of happiness is based on his prediction of a happy or even perfect
life in a communist society. Marx seldom identifies the life in a communist society as
a happy life, though he would not deny that life there is happy. Marx tends to
conceive communism as the precondition of real happiness for the entire human
species. Marx states that communism is “the doctrine of the conditions of the
liberation of the proletariat” (Manifesto, p. 44). It seems to Marx that communism
leads to happiness rather than vice versa. In this sense, Marx tends to suggest that
happiness is not the highest good of human beings, at least not the only one.
Besides happiness, Marx also stresses some other equivalently important goods
for human beings, such as the realization of human essence. Marx puts great emphasis
on it, and he uses several different expressions, such as “full development of all our
potentialities” and “rounded development of all members” to illustrate the realization
of human essence in a communist society. Expressions regarding men’s
self-realization or full development appear more frequently than happiness in Marx’s
writings. In addition, Marx also stresses freedom of the human species. When Marx
strongly criticizes the enslavement of workers, he tends to conceive freedom as a
standard to evaluate whether people are really “Men” and whether they can fully
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develop their capacities. For Marx, humans’ full development must represent by
freedom. He says, “…free, conscious activity is man’s species-character” (EPM, p.
31). When humans are no longer subject to the division of labor, they make their lives
free, and “the genuine and free development of individuals” can be achieved (The
German Ideology, p. 51). In brief, if Marx believes that there is a hierarchy of goods,
he tends to position happiness as a particular good among the highest goods, but not
the only one.
Second, Marx’s conception of happiness is based on his consideration of private
property and alienation. Regarding “what is happiness”, Marx does not give a direct
answer in his writings. However, his description of an unhappy life of workers in his
time may give us some clues on Marx’s view on “What contributes to happiness?”
For Marx, the workers of his time, regardless in which country they live, were
suffering from unhappy or even tragic lives. The unhappy lives, according to Marx,
derive from private property. For Marx, private property causes alienation, which
refers to the separation between humans’ labor from their products. That is, humans,
the proletariat in particular, cannot enjoy what they have created or produced by their
labor, which for Marx, is abnormal. Since people cannot enjoy what they have created,
they are unhappy. Marx believes that this alienation deriving from private property is
both the cause and demonstration of an unhappy life.
For Marx, self-realization is the opposite of alienation. For Marx, men, unlike
other animal species, are creators of not only the world but also themselves, because
men can produce “their means of subsistence” (The German Ideology, p.6).
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Consequently, men are “indirectly producing their actual material life” (The German
Ideology, p.6). In this sense, Marx affirms that by producing and enjoying what
human beings have created, men become men. He says, “As individuals express their
life, so they are” (The German Ideology, p.6). Marx calls this process the “realization
of human essence” (Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, p. 3). Marx believes an
ideal person should have the capacities to produce, and at the same time, enjoy the
production. In contrast, alienation represents that humans fail to express their lives or
realize their essence as human beings.
For Marx, since workers cannot afford and enjoy what they have produced, that
is, they are alienated from what they have created, it is impossible for them to have
happy lives. Marx thinks that these workers are “working animal[s]” and they are like
“beast[s] reduced to the strictest bodily needs” (EPM, p.7). Marx associates both
alienation and workers’ unhappy lives to private property; he believes that private
property is “the necessary consequence of alienated labor,” and the accumulation of
private property exacerbates the alienation and workers’ unhappiness (EPM, p.33).
According to Marx, workers provide labor, but they do not possess any productive
material or means, while capitalists have the productive property. Workers have to
sell their labor for a low wage, and capitalists purchase workers’ labor to produce.
Workers and capitalists are not equal to each other with regard to productive power
and production distribution. The latter always tend to maximize surplus value of the
products; workers are paid only a small amount of money to maintain their basic
living. For Marx, the conflict between workers and capitalists, labor and capital,
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actually represents the “antithesis between lack of property and property” (EPM, p.
42). That is, the conflict between worker and capitalists derives from different
possession of private property. As a result, Marx believes that in order to have a
happy life, people must first abolish private property and alienation based on it.
Third, for Marx, happiness involves social products sufficient for the satisfaction
of people’s needs. Marx sketches a possible happy life in an ideal society, a
communist society. Marx argues that all the productions of the society must be
managed communally, and the needs of the entire society should be satisfied
(Manifesto, p. 47-51). Marx also argues that in a communist society, “machinery and
other inventions made it possible to hold out the prospect of an all-sided development,
a happy existence, for all members of society” (Manifesto, p. 39). That is to say, a
communist society should have sufficient productions to satisfy the entire society’s
needs, at the same time to maintain everyone’s all-sided development.
Finally, Marx argues that happiness involves both happiness of the individual
and happiness for all. Marx argues that a communist society should be organized on
“certain irrefutable basic principles” (Manifesto, p. 37). According to Marx, these
basic principles include principles such as “every individual strives to be happy” and
“the happiness of the individual is inseparable from the happiness of all” (Manifesto,
p. 37). Since communism abolishes both alienation and private property, then the
entire society at large can be emancipated from all kinds of limitations derived from
private property and alienation. In this way, people may fully develop their capacities
and their relationships with one another. They are no longer alienated but cooperative.
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In this way, for Marx, people in a communist society can dedicate themselves to all.
As a result, Marx believes that in a communist society, happiness for a self is
consistent with happiness for other. This argument is also demonstrated in Marx’s
consideration of self-interest and common interest, which I will discuss later in
section 3.
2. Marx’s View on Voluntary and Involuntary
Marx’s view about the importance of voluntariness in one’s action is based on
his argument about labor, but not virtue. As discussed before, Marx is not directly
interested in morality or ethics, and he believes that morality could be used by the
ruling class as a tool of oppression. As a result, whether a virtuous action is voluntary
or not is not a question that Marx asks. However, Marx still covers the topic of
voluntary and involuntary action in his writing, but through the lens of labor rather
than ethics. Marx distinguishes voluntary labor from involuntary labor, and he values
the former as a form of humans’ self-assertion or self-realization of their humanity, or
in his words, the realization of human essence. At the same time, Marx objects to
involuntary labor and believes it represents humans’ self-denial.
Marx says:
… the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to
his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself
but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop
freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his
mind…His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor.
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It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy
needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as
soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the
plague.

(EPM, p.30)

For Marx, labor is a particular activity, that can only be done by humans rather
than any other animals in this world. According to Marx, through labor, humans
create not only the world around them but also themselves. As a result, labor as a
creative activity, represents humans’ self-realization. In addition, Marx believes that
humans, as both individuals and an entire species, should voluntarily and
cooperatively produce and enjoy their labor products. This process of both producing
and enjoying is the basis of a happy life, in the light of Marx. In this sense, Marx
argues that in an ideal society, everyone should labor voluntarily, because labor
contributes to his or her self-realization. In short, Marx proposes that voluntary labor
contributes to humans’ happy lives.
According to Marx, the workers of his time did not labor voluntarily, because the
workers could not enjoy the products that they have created. Marx describes that these
workers had to labor for a long time each day with low pay, but they could not afford
the products that they created through their labor. This kind of involuntary labor, for
Marx, does not lead to the realization of human essence. As a result, the workers of
his time were having unhappy lives. Marx argues that capitalists, who barely labor at
all, are happy by occupying what the workers have created. For Marx, involuntary
labor does not represent human’s intrinsic nature; also, humans deny rather than
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confirm themselves through this kind of work. As a result, involuntary labor is painful
for humans, and they feel forced to work. In this sense, Marx says that involuntary
labor leads to human’s unhappiness while voluntary labor lead to happiness.
Since Marx distinguishes voluntary labor from involuntary labor, would he also
distinguish voluntary virtue from involuntary virtue? It is difficult to find Marx’s
direct answer to this question, since Marx barely focuses on virtue or morality in his
writings. For Marx, a more meaningful question would be “Is morality/virtue
important?” rather than “Is voluntary morality/virtue important?” According to Marx,
morality or virtue is:
a) a particular mental production of human society;
b) can be used as a ruling tool to oppress the people; and
c) would disappear in a communist society.
Regarding mental production, Marx states:
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first
directly interwoven with the material activity and the material
intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the
mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of
their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as
expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion,
metaphysics, etc. of a people. Consciousness can never be anything else
than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual
life-process (The German Ideology, p. 9).
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For Marx, virtue or morality is a “mental production” of human beings, which is
no higher than any other production produced by human beings. That is, Marx does
not view virtue or morality as something superior, praiseworthy, or connecting to
happiness. Instead, Marx argues that the process of the “particular mode of
production,” which creates morality or virtue could be neutral. However, Marx
believes how the outcome of the mental production is used could be very negative or
blameworthy, for instance, it could be used as a means to rule or oppress. Marx
believes that in a class society, the dominant class usually determines the dominant
morality. He poses, “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”
(The German Ideology, p. 2). For example, Marx argues that in a capitalist society,
the bourgeois morality is preached to the proletariat by the capitalist as the ruling
morality. This morality, for Marx, is a deceptive means for the capitalists to
manipulate the proletariat and to maintain the capitalists’ rule. The capitalists may
preach to the workers the bourgeois morality such as submission or sobriety, so that
the workers may be satisfied with “temperate living and constant employment” and
would not rebel against the capitalists’ rule (Capital I, p. 485). By following this
morality, Marx suggests that the proletariat would not emancipate themselves from an
unfair and unequal system, not to mention having real happy life. What the proletariat
identify as happiness, such as religious happiness, according to Marx, is “illusory
happiness.” In this sense, bourgeois morality hinders rather than contributes to the
happiness of the proletariat. As a result, Marx argues that it does not matter whether
being in accordance with a certain morality is voluntary or not, since anyhow it would
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not result in happiness, freedom, or self-assertion.
Surely, there are some cases where morality or virtue is not used as a tool of
ruling. For instance, there are some universal moral principles such as honesty, which
are not used as a means of oppression. In this kind of case, would Marx agree that it is
better for one to be voluntarily honest than involuntarily? Marx tends not to answer
this question independently; he would ask to know about the social conditions where
the case exists. As discussed before, Marx’s discussion of voluntary or involuntary is
from an economic or sociological perspective rather than an ethical one. He objects to
discussing virtue or morality without considering its social conditions.
For example, Marx says:
The ethics of political economy is acquisition, work, thrift, sobriety – but
political economy promises to satisfy my needs. – The political economy
of ethics is the opulence of a good conscience, of virtue, etc.; but how can
I live virtuously if I do not live? And how can I have a good conscience if
I do not know anything? It stems from the very nature of estrangement
that each sphere applies to me a different and opposite yardstick… (EPM
of 1844, p.51-52)
In this quotation, Marx demonstrates several concerns regarding the meaning of
being virtuous. First of all, Marx believes that we can never discuss virtue separately
from its existing social conditions, which is for Marx the premise of morality or virtue.
Marx would like to know “What are the social conditions?” and “What kind of life
that a person is living?” For those who barely have lives, Marx doubts the meaning of
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being virtuous for those people. Marx does not explain what he means by “do not live”
in this quotation. Based on his analysis on the tragic life of people in his time, Marx
suggests that a normal life that everyone should live would be a life where people can
realize their human essence through their voluntary labor, that is, they could
cooperatively create and enjoy their products together. If people do not have normal
lives, or “do not live,” then Marx would argue that it is not important whether they are
virtuous or not.
Second, Marx is concerned for the potential conflict among different virtues or
moralities, because according to Marx, different classes may produce contradictory
virtues. This consideration is based on Marx’s view on estrangement, which is a
process that humans are estranged from not only materials that they have produced,
but also from other human beings. When humans are estranged from one another, as
individuals or as members of particular classes, conflict arises, not only in their
interest but also in their mental production. In this sense, Marx argues, “each sphere
applies to me a different and opposite yardstick.” As a result, before considering
whether a virtuous action is voluntary or not, he would first focus on “Which class’s
morality?” or “What kind of morality is it?”.
In addition, Marx claims that morality, as a particular mental product of humans,
will disappear in a communist society. He says in the Manifesto, “Communism
abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of
constituting them on a new basis” (p. 26). That is, for Marx, people in a communist
society are free from all morality. If all the moral principles would never exist in a
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communist society, according to Marx, then what is the point to discuss voluntariness
or involuntariness in following these principles?
In summary, Marx views the importance of voluntariness through the lens of
labor rather than virtue. He believes that voluntary labor represents self-realization of
human essence, while involuntary labor represents their self-denial. Marx would
reject Aristotle’s argument on the dependence between happiness and virtue, because
for Marx, happiness might come together with humans’ self-realization rather than
being according with virtue. Moreover, Marx believes that certain morality or virtue
could be used as a ruling tool and would lead to unhappiness or “illusory happiness.”
Marx does not believe that voluntariness in virtue is an important issue. For Marx,
virtue or morality, as a mental product of certain social conditions, will disappear in a
communist society. As a result, Marx doubts the necessity of virtue or morality in a
state, regardless of whether it is voluntary or involuntary. Also, Marx would argue
that we should not separately conceive of virtue or morality from their existing social
conditions. He thinks that it is meaningless to discuss virtue when people are not
having normal lives.
3. Marx’s View on Self-interest and Common Interest
In general, Marx does not demonstrate a negative attitude towards self-interest
compared to his attitude towards private property. Marx’s view on self-interest can be
summarized as follows:
a) Concern for interest in self, just as egoism and selflessness, is a social
consciousness determined by social conditions, which is not blameworthy or
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praiseworthy.
b) Self-constraint is not the only option to make people stay away from egoism or
selfishness.
c) Self-interest and common interest mutually shaped each other rather than
conflict each other.
Regarding point a), Marx says:
Communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to
egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its
sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; they rather demonstrate
its material source, with which it disappears of itself. The Communists do
not preach morality at all. They do not put to people the moral demand:
love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very
well aware that egoism, just as much selflessness, is in definite
circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals (The
German Ideology, p.58).
This quotation contains a few of Marx’s important ideas regarding self-interest.
First of all, Marx does not think egoism or selflessness is a moral issue, because of his
rejection of morality. For Marx, egoism and selflessness can be just “necessary form[s]
of the self-assertion of individuals.” These forms of self-assertion are determined by
their circumstances or “material source.” Moreover, Marx believes that egoism is not
necessarily opposite to selflessness, because they are different forms determined by
different social conditions. That is, to oppose egoism to selflessness is like to oppose
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an apple to a banana, which seems to Marx pointless. According to Marx, egoism is a
phenomenon existing in certain societies, for instance a capitalist society. People in a
capitalist society may demonstrate egoism; they may attempt to act in their own
self-interests without considering others’ interests. This egoism, for Marx, is not
based on human nature but on private property. In Marx’ view, if private property
were abolished, then the egoism originating from private property would disappear.
On the other hand, for Marx, selflessness is not a virtue that should be preached.
People in a communist society will naturally be selfless, because private property, the
root of egoism and the hindrance for selflessness, would be abolished. In this sense,
Marx argues that people in a communist society are concerned most of all for
common interest. In brief, Marx believes that both egoism and selflessness are merely
two forms of self-assertion that are determined by certain social circumstances. As
long as these social circumstances exist, so do the particular “form[s] of self-assertion
of individuals.” The forms themselves, as results of certain social conditions, are
neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy.
In addition, Marx does not believe that self-constraint from desires is a good way
to achieve selflessness. First of all, Marx argues that it is not necessary to always
control one’s desires. For instance, he argues that in, and only in, a communist society,
people do not at all need to restrain from or oppress their needs and desires, because
they will no longer have excessive or inappropriate desires that should be bridled.
Marx states:
… the Communists are the only people through whose historical activity
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the liquefaction of the fixed desires and ideas is in fact brought about and
ceases to be an impotent moral injunction… Communist organization has
a twofold effect on the desires produced in the individual by present-day
relations; some of these desires — namely desires which exist under all
relations, and only change their form and direction under different social
relations — are merely altered by the Communist social system, for they
are given the opportunity to develop normally; but others — namely those
originating solely in a particular society, under particular conditions of
[production] and intercourse — are totally deprived of their conditions of
existence (The German Ideology, p. 51).
For Marx, people’s desires are produced by social conditions where people live.
Some desires such as eating and drinking exist across different social forms. These
kinds of desires only change their forms but will not disappear in a communist society.
According to Marx, a communist society would have sufficient materials or products
to satisfy these kinds of desires. Regarding excessive desires, such as obsession for
unlimited delicious food and delicate clothes, Marx argues that they are actually
desires developed abnormally. If these desires are “given the opportunity to develop
normally” (in a communist society), then there would be no excessive desires at all. In
short, people’s universal desires will be well satisfied in a communist society, so
people eventually do not need to oppress them at all. On the other hand, for desires
originating from particular social conditions - for instance desires for profits or
surplus values in a capitalist society – these desires will disappear in a communist
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society because of the abolishment of their social conditions. As a result, Marx
believes that people in a communist society do not need to restrain from or suppress
these particular desires at well, because they will no longer exist there due to the
abolishment of their particular social conditions. For Marx, the only way to eliminate
egoism is to abolish all social conditions that cause egoism.
Moreover, Marx tends to criticize the preaching (or teaching) of self-restraint to
the people. For Marx, as long as the material circumstances that arouse egoism exists,
it is impotent to preach or teach the virtue of self-restraint to make people stay away
from egoism. Marx believes that egoism itself should not take blame or critique; he
does not value self-restraint or desire-control as a virtue. As Marx argues, to require
people to oppress their desire is actually an “an impotent moral injunction” in a
capitalist society (The German Ideology, p. 51). By this argument, Marx does not
endorse greed or egoism. He does not suggest that people should let their desires run
wild. His point is that virtue preaching or teaching, in a capitalist society in particular,
is just a means of ruling rather than a way to improve people’s morality. Marx argues
that the proletariat is preached at with the morality of self-restraint, the proletariat is
expected by the capitalists to take social conditions as they are; that is, to be satisfied
with low salary and poor living conditions and never rebel against the capitalists’ rule.
In this sense, Marx rejects self-restraint or desire-control as virtues.
As for the relation between self-interest and common interest, Marx does not
believe that self-interest and common interest always conflict with each other. For
instance, when criticizing Sahcho’s idea that “personal interest” comes into
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contradiction with “class interest” or “common interest,” Marx says:
Incidentally, even in the banal, petty-bourgeois German form in which
Sancho perceives contradiction of personal and general interests, he
should realize that individuals have always started out from themselves,
and could not do otherwise, and that therefore the two aspects he noted are
aspects of the personal development of individuals; both are equally
engendered by the empirical conditions under which the individuals live,
both are only expressions of one and the same personal development of
people and are therefore only in seeming contradiction to each other (The
German Ideology, p. 50).
For Marx, it is natural for one to be concerned for self-interest, because every
individual has an interest in food, clothing, shelter, and so forth to maintain his or her
life. As a result, private interest, according to Marx, is the starting point of human life.
While in a society, however, few can really isolate themselves from others and live all
by themselves, and then common interest becomes an unavoidable concern due to the
interdependent relationship between humans. In this sense, Marx believes that both
self-interest and common interest are only two aspects of “the personal development
of individuals.” They both are equally engendered by the social conditions where the
individuals live, and they co-exist with each other. In addition, self-interest and
common interest do not necessarily conflict with one another. If there is a
contradiction between them, then for Marx, this contradiction is just “seeming” rather
than real. In order to explain why this contradiction is a “seeming” one, Marx says:
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Communist theoreticians… have discovered that throughout history the
"general interest" is created by individuals who are defined as "private
persons". They know that this contradiction is only a seeming one because
one side of it, what is called the "general interest", is constantly being
produced by the other side, private interest, and in relation to the latter is
by no means an independent force with an independent history — so that
this contradiction is in practice constantly destroyed and reproduced (The
German Ideology, p. 58).
For Marx, common interest and self-interest mutually shape each other rather
than conflict with each other. For instance, I want the place I live to be pleasant and
clean; this is based on my self-interest. You want your place pleasant and clean; this is
based largely on your self-interest. Supposed we are neighbors, and since we both
want a pleasant and clean environment, then our common interest arises. That is, we
both want not only my place, but also your place to be pleasant and clean. Otherwise,
a messy and dirty neighbor could destroy one’s desire for a pleasant place. In this
sense, Marx argues that a person, in a practical sense, cannot be purely egoistical, that
is, be exclusively concerned for the interest in self without taking others’ interests into
consideration. Due to “the developed mode of production and intercourse and the
division of labor,” everyone needs others (The German Ideology, p. 17). When people
satisfy their own needs, they must in return satisfy some of others’ needs. As a result,
in Marx’s view, people have to make self-interest in harmony with common interest if
they want to have a good life in the long run.
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Since, according to Marx, common interest and self-interest constantly reshape
each other, then why do they sometimes seem to contradict each other? For Marx, it is
because societies of his time make people compete with each other rather than
cooperate with each other. And this competition, which according to Marx is not
necessary for human life but rather caused by particular social conditions, engenders
the seeming conflict between one’s interest and another’s, between self-interest and
common interest. For instance, in a capitalist society, capitalists ignore and even
infringe upon the proletariat’s interest in order to guarantee maximizing their profits.
Meanwhile, the proletariat requires and struggles for higher salaries and this, from the
perspective of capitalists, harms their self-interest. The interest conflict between these
two classes is caused by its social condition based on private property. Marx believes
that this seeming contradiction is in practice constantly “destroyed and reproduced,”
until a communist society is established. In a communist society, class struggle will
disappear, so will the unnecessary conflict between one another classes. Self-interest
and common interest will be harmonious with each other. Maybe to some extent,
there will be no concern for self-interest any more, as Marx states, “In a true state it is
not a question of the possibility of every citizen to dedicate himself to the universal in
the form of a particular class, but of the capability of the universal class to be really
universal, i.e., to be the class of every citizen” (Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy, p. 47).
That is to say, for Marx, in a communist society where everyone is in the universal
class, every citizen can dedicate oneself to common interest and make self-interest
consistent to common interest.
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To summarize this section, for Marx, concern for self-interest is neutral rather
than negative, to what extent people are concerned for self-interest is determined by
different social conditions where people live. If people demonstrate selfishness or
egoism when pursuing their own interests, this is determined by their social
conditions. Moreover, for Marx, egoism is not some something that can be overcome
through self-restrain. Marx suggests that if people want to eliminate egoism, they
should focus on the abolishment of social conditions that cause egoism, rather then to
control or suppress their desires. Finally, Marx believes that self-interest is not
necessarily in conflict with common interest. Instead, self-interest is the basis for
common interest.
4. Conclusion
For Marx, happiness is one of the highest goods of human beings; happiness is
not superior to other highest goods such as freedom and self-realization of human
essence. According to Marx, private property causes alienation of human beings: that
is, human beings are alienated not only from what they have created through their
labor, but also human beings are alienated from one another. People will not be happy
as long as this alienation exists. As a result, Marx argues that people should abolish
private property in order to achieve really happy lives. In addition, Marx believes that
voluntary labor leads to happiness, while involuntary labor leads to unhappiness.
Moreover, Marx believes that concern for self-interest is a social consciousness
caused by social conditions, and self-interest itself is neither blameworthy nor
praiseworthy.
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CHAPTER 4: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF
ARISTOTLE’S AND MARX’S VIEWS OF HAPPINESS
Based on the previous discussion of both Aristotle’s and Marx’s view of
happiness, we can find both agreement and disagreement between them on different
issues, such as “What is the highest good of human beings?” and “What contributes to
happiness?” Aristotle conceives happiness as the highest good of human beings, while
Marx suggests other options as the highest good(s), such as freedom and
self-realization of human essence. Also, Aristotle stresses the significance of
voluntary virtue, while Marx tends to doubt this significance. Regarding the issue of
self-interest, both Aristotle and Marx justify the appropriate concern of self-interest.
However, Aristotle believes that the maintenance of private property benefits
self-interest and common interest, while Marx insists that the abolishment of private
property is the only way to benefit everyone. In this section, I compare their views
regarding happiness, morality, voluntary virtue, and self-interest.
1. Is Happiness the Highest Good among all Kinds of Good?
Marx tends to conceive communism as the highest good because for Marx,
communism represents the only perfect way that people manage their lives and enjoy
happiness. According to Marx, communism implies the realization of not only
happiness, but also of emancipation, liberty, freedom, self-assertion, all-sided
development, and so forth. That is, for Marx, communism implies a perfect life,
which embraces all kinds of necessary and important things for human beings,
including happiness. In contrast, Aristotle conceives of happiness as the highest good.
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According to Aristotle, if we call something the highest good, we mean that we desire
this thing for its own sake rather than anything else. For other goods, we can provide
an answer to “What do we want this good for?” For instance, we want delicious food
for health, for pleasure and so forth. However, we desire happiness just for happiness;
there is no further goal after we have achieved happiness. We cannot find a plausible
answer to “What do we want happiness for?” because there is nothing else beyond
happiness that people pursue. In this sense, Aristotle believes happiness is the ultimate
good that people desire.
Although Marx would not view happiness as the highest good of human beings,
he tends to agree with Aristotle that the highest good of human beings, if there is such
a good, is essentially a kind of life. For Marx, everyone in, and only in, a communist
society can have this life. If we suppose communism is the highest good, then we can
still continue our inquiry of “What do we want communism for?” In this case, “we
want communism for communism” is not a convincing answer. For instance, one may
argue that we want communism because in the communist society we human beings
can emancipate ourselves and can all have happy lives. In this sense, we want
communism not for its own sake, but for a perfect life there. If someone insists that
communism is the highest good, then in this way, happiness and communism may be
synonyms to each other, both referring to something good or perfect that we want for
its own sake and something which embraces other good things and lacks nothing.
However, even if happiness and communism may be synonyms in terms of a
perfect kind of life, I argue that happiness rather than communism is a better answer
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to the question “What is the highest good?” My argument is based on the following
consideration. First of all, communism, although we can conceive of it as a particular
life, generally refers to a way to manage a society. That is, the core meaning of
communism centers on management rather than life, as how communism is
commonly interpreted. Society management could be a sub-concept of life; for
instance, how we manage a state in a given society is one aspect of a particular life in
that society. In this sense, society management may be a subordinate and dependent
concept of life; consequently, happiness rather than communism represents a higher
concept of human beings.
Second, when we attempt to explain why communism is the highest good,
usually we need to use happiness as a dimension to describe how good communism is
for human beings. For instance, we may say communism is the highest good because
in a communist society everyone enjoys happiness. In this sense, it implies that
happiness is either easier to understand, or happiness is the ultimate goal of human
life compared to communism.
Finally, happiness, as Aristotle suggests as the highest good of human beings,
involves both happiness of an individual and happiness of others. In light of Aristotle,
happiness is both an individually-oriented and a state-oriented concept. Aristotle
believes happiness involves both happiness of an individual and happiness of others.
Also, Aristotle focuses on a happy state where everyone does well and lives well, that
is, happiness of individuals contributes to a happy state. Aristotle's conception of
happiness follows the line from happiness of individuals to happiness of a state. In

	
  

	
  
	
  

62	
  

contrast, communism is a society-oriented concept in Marx’s view. That is,
communism is not about any single individual’s life but a life that constituted by all
the people (as a group) of a communist society. When Marx talks about happiness, he
focuses on happiness of the entire human species rather than that of individuals. In
this sense, Marx’s conception of happiness may follow the line from society to
individuals. In practice, it is not that we human beings create a happy state first, and
then enjoy the happiness derived from the happy state. Rather, society is constituted
of individuals; happiness of a state or society is based on happiness of individuals and
is achieved based on the achievement of individuals’ happiness. As a result, it is
necessary to conceive of the highest good of human beings not only from the
perspective of a state or society, but also from the perspective of individuals. In this
sense, happiness, based on the highest good for both individuals and a state is better
than communism to be viewed as the highest good of human beings, which centers
mainly on a society rather than individuals.
2. What Contributes to the Highest Good?
Aristotle states, “the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be
perfect happiness” (NE, Book X). For Aristotle, being in accordance with virtue leads
to happiness. As a result, Aristotle suggests that to cultivate virtue is the most
important means to achieve happiness. In contrast, Marx rejects the significance of
morality or virtue, and he argues that in order to achieve the highest good
(communism in Marx’s view) people need to abolish the basis for their unhappiness,
which is private property and alienation based on it. In this sense, Marx questions the
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necessity to teach morality or virtue in contrast to what Aristotle insists. Then, the
first question is “Do human beings need morality and virtue?”
Marx tends to say “No.” He argues that in a communist society, all morality,
religion, and virtue will disappear. Also, he insists that in a communist society
everyone will dedicate oneself to others. Since dedicating oneself to others is a
particular virtue that is valued nowadays in many societies, let us use it as an example
to discuss whether human beings need virtue. The reason that we believe dedication is
a virtue is that it illustrates a certain kind of good or excellence in human character.
We value it because in many cases people behave oppositely, that is, rather than
dedicating oneself to others, people tend not to do so. According to Marx, everyone
can be dedicated in a communist society; that is, dedication, as a particular character
trait, will not disappear. Rather, people in a communist society will not identify
dedication as a virtue, since everyone naturally behaves in a dedicated way. In this
sense, in a communist society, people still need good character traits such as
dedication, but people will not name them as morality or virtue.
Similarly, in light of Marx, people in a communist society will be honest,
righteous, hardworking, and so forth. Everyone there performs these good character
traits naturally, and nobody would behave reversely. In this sense, it is not that virtue
or morality disappears in a communist society; instead, immoral or bad behavior will
disappear there. By proposing that all morality and religion will disappear in a
communist society, Marx refers to those morality and religious virtues that are used as
ruling tools in a capitalist society, and he believes they will no longer exist in a
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communist society. Moreover, virtue such as dedication and honesty will become
human beings’ second nature or even nature in a communist society, but people would
not call them virtue. Additionally, virtue would not be distinguished from what we are
considered immoral today, and immorality would ultimately disappear in a
communist society. As a result, people in a communist society still possess and need
what we call morality or virtue today.
Even if Marx is correct that happiness has nothing to do with morality or virtue,
and people would be automatically happy in a communist society. The question
remains “How should people treat morality or virtue before the establishment of
communism?” Should people totally ignore morality and virtue in order to achieve
happiness, because according to Marx by following moral principles one would not
achieve real happiness? If people reject morality or virtue now, then how would
people determine whether an action is right or wrong? Without moral principles,
wouldn’t people just follow their instincts or act randomly? In that case, wouldn’t
people become barbarians or beasts and by no means realize their human essence?
Marx does not discuss in detail how people would treat morality or virtue before
communism is successfully constituted. However, given the fact that morality and
virtue has existed and will exist for a long time, also, given the importance and
necessity of morality and virtue in regulating humans’ behaviors, it is not wise for us
to reject morality or virtue right away. Rather, it would be worthy of us to consider
how to cultivate morality and virtue in people and to avoid using them as ruling
means.
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Next, let us explore whether morality or virtue contributes to happiness.
Supposed they do not. Then, the question is “What contributes to happiness?” Besides
virtue, they are many other desirable things make people happy, such as wealth, honor,
love, and so forth. Would they contribute to happiness? The answer is “Yes, but not
necessarily." For instance, we have heard that many wealthy people are complaining
that they are not happy. Sometimes wealthy people identify themselves as the poor
who have only money but nothing else, which makes them unhappy. This is probably
because they don’t know how to utilize their wealth to pursue happiness. To properly
use wealth is an issue based on rational principles. That is, it is necessary to involve
morality or virtue for one to utilize wealth to pursue happiness. For instance, wealthy
people can donate money to help people in need and to make their lives better. If the
wealthy people are happy for helping others, it is not because they are rich but
because they are helping. Wealth, in this case, is the condition to enable wealthy
people to be happily helping others. That is, helping others is the particular virtue that
makes wealthy people happy.
Similarly, honor may contribute to happiness, but not necessarily so. Some
people with great honor are not happy because they are suffering from all kinds of
stress aroused by their success. There are examples where successful people try to
avoid being honored by the public to maintain their quiet lives. If honor contributes to
happiness, then why do these people avoid honor rather than pursuing it? One may
argue that it is because honor may cause some disadvantages such as stress, though
honor contributes to happiness. According to Aristotle, happiness is the most
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desirable thing of human beings, and it lacks nothing. If happiness aroused by honor
is also accompanied by painful things such as stress, then, this kind of happiness is
not genuine or perfect in light of Aristotle.
Love also makes people happy in many cases. Both being loved and giving love
to others can lead to happiness. However, too much love may become dotage and
cause spoiling, which is not desirable for human beings. In addition, not all kinds of
love contribute to happiness. For instance, love could become troublesome if one’s
love is not welcomed by another. That is, only proper love at a proper time
contributes to happiness. In order to love properly, rational principles for love are
necessary. These principles are within the scope of morality or virtue. In a word,
many desirable things such as wealth, honor, and love contribute to but do not
necessarily lead to happiness. If they do, they need the guidance of morality or virtue.
Another possible element that contributes to happiness is chance. Aristotle
rejects this idea by saying “To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble
would be a very defective arrangement” (NE, Book I). If people rely on chance to
give them happiness, then, people would not take any effort to learn anything that
would contribute to happiness. Marx would call this behavior self-denial of human
essence, that is, people act in a way that they are rejecting their potentials and
possibilities to become better as human beings. For both Aristotle and Marx, chance is
never a determinant factor of happiness. Otherwise, for those people who have bad
fortune, their lives do not deserve living at all because they may be destined to be
unhappy forever.
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In contrast, being accordance with virtue solely can contribute to happiness. That is,
even if without other desirable things such as wealth or honor, virtue itself can lead to
happiness. A virtuous person may be poor. However, when this person exercises
virtuous actions, he or she may be truly happy, even though being poor is generally a
painful rather than pleasant thing. Also, this person’s virtuous actions may not be
honored or even recognized by others, but still this virtuous person is happy without
possessing honor. In addition, virtue is consistent with rational principles; it is related
to the rational part of the soul. On the contrary, wealth, honor, and love may be
related to people’s irrational parts of the soul. Without the instruction of the rational
part of the soul, people’s pursuits of other desirable things could be inappropriate,
which may lead to unhappiness. Virtue guides a person to properly pursue desirable
things such as wealth and honor and to use them appropriately, so that people can
pursue happiness.
In this sense, Aristotle’s argument regarding happiness and virtue makes more
sense than Marx’s. According to Aristotle, happiness is a kind of life that embraces all
kinds of good; also, it is the highest good, which embraces good not only for
individuals but also for a state as a whole. Meanwhile, Aristotle believes that virtue is
an excellence (the highest form of a particular good), which is based on rational
principles and makes a thing/person good and work well. In this sense, virtue or
excellence based on rational principles is the foundation of happiness in light of
Aristotle. Based on my previous discussion, many other desirable things such as
wealth and honor benefit happiness but do not necessarily lead to happiness. In
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contrast, morality or virtue solely can make a person happy. Moreover, morality and
virtue will still exist until someday when people are naturally virtuous. As a result,
Aristotle’s argument regarding happiness and virtue inspires us to teach morality or
virtue to benefit everyone’s happy life.
3. Is Voluntary Virtue Better than Involuntary Virtue?
Based on Aristotle’s arguments regarding voluntary actions and involuntary
actions, he believes that in the sphere of virtue, voluntary virtue is better than
involuntary virtue. This argument is based on Aristotle’s conception of happiness.
According to Aristotle, in order to be completely or perfectly happy, one should
always be in accordance with virtue. However, if a person exercises virtue without
deliberation, or if this person’s virtuous actions are moved by some outside principles,
Aristotle argues that this person may not gain happiness from his or her virtuous
action because he or she does not have a desire in doing so. He or she either exercises
a virtuous action by force, or he or she happens to perform it accidently. In these two
cases, the person may not have pleasure in performing the virtuous actions. According
to Aristotle, if a person cannot enjoy virtuous action, he or she can hardly be called a
virtuous person; neither would he or she gain happiness through that virtuous action.
That is, Aristotle thinks that the person is not happy when he or she involuntarily
performs that virtuous action.
One may argue that a person can still be happy for an involuntarily virtuous
action. For instance, a person may incidentally help others, and he will be happy for
the outcome, though he did not mean to help others. However, this kind of happiness
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is not perfect, according to Aristotle. It seems to Aristotle that chance rather than
one’s reason or rational part in the soul contributes to this kind of happiness. That is,
for Aristotle, happiness derived from involuntary virtue would be inferior to
happiness based on voluntary virtue. In this sense, Aristotle would argue voluntary
virtue contributes more to happiness rather than involuntary virtue.
Would Marx agree with Aristotle that voluntary virtue is better than involuntary
virtue, based on his arguments on voluntary labor? As discussed before, since Marx
rejects the significance of virtue or morality, he may have little interest in answering
this question. Or at least, Marx would first ask, “What kind of morality are we talking
about?” For instance, if it only involves the bourgeois’ morality, which for Marx is a
means to oppress and tame the proletariat, then his answer would be “involuntary
virtue is better than voluntary.” First of all, for Marx, if workers voluntarily exercise
bourgeois’ morality such as submission, it implies that the capitalists have
successfully brainwashed the workers. It also implies that the workers have largely
internalized the bourgeois’ morality. On the contrary, if workers involuntarily perform
the bourgeois’ morality, it implies, to some extent, the workers resist this morality.
This resistance, for Marx, is a promising power to be aroused in the workers and to
lead them to rebel against the bourgeois’ exploitation. However, when it comes to the
case of labor, Marx definitely believes that voluntary labor is necessary to happiness,
because people can realize their human essence only through voluntary labor.
Also, Marx would agree with Aristotle that a moving principle inside contributes
to happiness more than a moving principle outside. Suppose happiness is a destination
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where many people want to arrive. Some people purposefully walk toward there,
while others barely move but happen to be delivered there by a wind or be dragged
there by someone else. In this case, Aristotle believes that the former group of people
are moved by moving principles in a person, while the latter being moved by moving
principles in the abstract. For Aristotle, although both groups of people arrived at the
destination happiness, the former contribute more to this arriving than the latter. What
Aristotle emphasizes is that when a person voluntarily initiates a virtuous action, and
he or she enjoys performing this virtuous action, this is much better than when he or
she is forced to or accidently exercises the virtuous action. With regards to Marx’s
argument of voluntary labor and involuntary labor, since workers who labor
voluntarily can cooperate well with each other and can completely enjoy their
working productions, the workers have desire to labor; and they are move by moving
principles in a person. On the other hand, for those workers who labor involuntarily,
they are forced to work rather than having a desire to work, consequently, they are
moved by moving principles in the abstract.
To summarize the discussion of voluntary virtue, Marx agrees with Aristotle that
moving principles in a person contribute more to happiness than external moving
principles. In this sense, if we expect people to behave in certain way, for instance to
voluntarily labor in light of Marx and to be voluntarily virtuous in light of Aristotle, it
is important for us to arouse moving principles inside rather than imposing outside
moving principles on people. However, when it comes to dealing with a particular
virtue, which can be used as a ruling tool, then, Marx reminds us to be cautious to
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cultivate this kind of virtue. For instance, when attempting to cultivate obedience as a
particular virtue, it is worthy of us to first justify that when and how obedience is a
virtue. It is also worthy of us to think that whether cultivating this virtue contributes to
happiness.
4. Is Habituation a Necessary Way to Cultivate Voluntary Virtue?
Aristotle believes it is. For Aristotle, before being taught or trained to be
virtuous, people, average people in particular, tend to behave reversely. For instance,
people tend to unlimitedly satisfy their desires and needs due to people’s ignorance of
virtue, and this tendency is opposite to what Aristotle calls continence, a particular
moral virtue. Also, after being taught moral virtue or moral principles, average
people, according to Aristotle, may still behave oppositely. For instance, sometimes
people know that it is good for them to be continent, but still they refuse to do so.
Aristotle believes that this is because there is something in human nature that is
opposite to moral virtues. That is, for Aristotle, people’s resistance to moral virtue
comes from their nature. Aristotle attributes this resistance to the irrational parts of the
soul, and he argues that the irrational parts of the soul may hinder one’s being
virtuous. Since according to Aristotle, moral virtues do not exist in human nature, and
they usually encounter the resistance in human nature, people need to be trained to be
virtuous.
Aristotle proposes that habituation is a necessary way to cultivate moral virtue in
people, average people and slaves in particular, who do not have the wisdom to know
what is really good for them. For Aristotle, although the irrational parts of the soul in
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human nature resist moral virtue, this does not suggest that moral virtue cannot be
cultivated because the rational part of the soul is ready to receive moral virtue. As he
says, “we are adapted by nature to receive them [moral virtue], and are made perfect
by habit” (NE, Book II). That is, human nature provides not only resistance, but also
and more important, the potentials for people to receive and internalize moral virtue.
In this sense, habituation is necessary for human beings to cultivate moral virtue in
themselves. Aristotle states, “moral virtue comes about as a result of habit” (NE,
Book II). He also states, “we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (NE, Book II). This indicates that for
Aristotle, continuous performing certain virtue contributes to the cultivation of these
virtues.
Then, does Aristotle believe that habituation contributes to the cultivation of
voluntary virtue? Aristotle tends to say “yes,” because he believes that human beings
are “made perfect by habit” (NE, Book II). Since for Aristotle, voluntary virtue
contributes more to happiness than involuntary virtue, and involuntary virtue may
lead to happiness, but not the perfect happiness, then, only voluntary virtue rather than
involuntary virtue contributes to the perfectness of human beings. In addition,
Aristotle quotes Evenus’ words, “I say that habit's but a long practice, friend, and this
becomes men's nature in the end” (NE, Book II). That is to say, for Aristotle, people
will finally exercise virtue voluntarily, when moral virtue becomes their nature
through habituation. In this sense, for Aristotle, habituation is not only a necessary
way to overcome ignorance and resistance to moral virtue, but also a necessary way to
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cultivate voluntary virtue, because only voluntary virtue contributes to perfect
happiness.
Although Aristotle has a strong belief in cultivating voluntary virtue in people
through habituation, he also suggests that habituation may not work well on everyone
in virtue cultivation. His arguments are based on the following considerations:
a) Habituation cannot change all the people to the same degree.
b) Through habituation, not only moral virtue can be cultivated in people, but
also bad habits to destroy virtue can be cultivated.
First of all, habituation may not work on people to the same degree in virtue
cultivation. For Aristotle, different classes of people have different qualities; some
classes are superior to others, in terms of intellect and capacities. Also, Aristotle
believes that different classes may possess different virtues; some virtues may not be
possessed by all. For instance, Guardians have virtues that common people and slaves
do not have, because according to Aristotle, the former have intellectual wisdom
while the latter do not. As a result, Aristotle argues that it may be easier to cultivate
moral virtue in some people but much more difficult in others. For instance, Aristotle
believes that continence is cultivated more in excitable people than “those who
deliberate but do not abide by their decisions” (NE, Book VII).
Second, Aristotle believes that both virtue and evil can be cultivated through the
process of habituation. He says, “Again, it is from the same causes and by the same
means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed” (NE, Book II). According to
Aristotle, just as both a good player and bad player are produced by practice
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lyre-playing, good and bad habits are produced through habituation, so are good and
bad character traits. That is, sometimes virtue cultivation through habituation may go
off the track: instead of cultivating moral virtue in people; habituation arouses and
cultivates some bad habits.
Aristotle’s considerations of habituation remind us of some potential difficulties
in virtue cultivation through habit. However, it is not a good way to identify
differences among people based on a class hierarchy, as Aristotle suggests. People’s
intellectual or capacities differ from one another, but not in a superior or inferior way.
Also, the difference is not determined by birth only and cannot be changed through
practice. As a result, although through the same process of habituation, moral virtue
can be cultivated more in some people and less in others, this does not suggest that
habituation cannot work on the latter. It suggests that it may take longer to cultivate
virtue in certain people through habituation. Although bad habits can also be
produced and cultivated in people through habituation, it does not suggest that
habituation is not a good way to cultivate virtue. Rather, it reminds us to avoid
cultivating bad habits through habituation.
In contrast, for Marx, it is not necessary to cultivate morality or virtue in people.
For instance, Marx believes that in a communist society everyone would be selfless,
this selflessness is not a virtue being directly cultivated through habituation but a
natural outcome in a communist society. Also, Marx tends to reject cultivating
voluntary virtue through habituation, because he argues that the purpose of this
habituation could be to oppress the ruled class in a class society. If it is the case, then,
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Marx doubts that this kind of voluntary virtue contributes to happiness. For Marx, if
people voluntarily exercise this kind of virtue, it may be very difficult to arouse a
consciousness of rejection to this virtue in order to pursue real happiness.
In addition, Marx argues that it may be fruitless to attempt to replace involuntary
virtue with voluntary ones, because according to Marx, people’s resistance or
involuntariness to particular virtue is determined by their existing social
circumstances. For instance, in a capitalist society where human beings are alienated
from one another, people tend to compete with and even antagonize each other rather
than cooperate with one another. This alienated human relationship, according to
Marx, is determined by the productive forces and the relation of production at that
time. As a result, people are doomed to compete with and antagonize one another, as
long as the social conditions maintain. In this sense, Marx argues that it may be
fruitless to cultivate the virtue of cooperation in people in a capitalist society because
people tend to behave reversely, and this tendency cannot be eliminated in a capitalist
society. For Marx, voluntary cooperation cannot be achieved through habituation.
Compared to Aristotle, Marx demonstrates little support to habituation as a
necessary way to cultivate voluntary virtue. Marx reminds us that virtue cultivation
cannot be applied in a vacuum environment; that is, in order to cultivate virtue, it is
worthy of people to take into consideration the social conditions of a given society.
This may help people determine whether a virtue is actually a virtue, or if it is just a
means to oppress the people.
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5. What Is the Relation between Happiness and Achievement and/or Sacrifice of
Self-interest?
For Aristotle, both advancement of self-interest and sacrifice of self-interest, at a
proper time and to a proper degree, may lead to happiness. Aristotle believes that
appropriate self-interest is positive in humans’ development. By appropriate, Aristotle
emphasizes that the concern of self-interest should not be excessive, otherwise it
becomes egoism, which is criticized by Aristotle. For Aristotle, when people are
appropriately concerned for self-interest, they will focus on making their personal
progress. According to Aristotle, the more progress one has made, the more one may
contribute to a state. For instance, one may pay more tax, which in turn would be used
to improve people’ lives. In this way, appropriate self-interest contributes to
happiness. Meanwhile, Aristotle believes that sacrifice of self-interest is a noble virtue.
Since virtue also leads to happiness, Aristotle believes that sacrifice of self-interest
also contributes to happiness.
For Marx, self-interest is the starting point of human lives. In order to survive,
one has to first act in the interest in self, such as to first satisfy one’s own needs and
desires. Otherwise, one may suffer from unsatisfied needs, such as hunger. In this
sense, Marx agrees with Aristotle that self-interest contributes to happiness. Also,
Marx values sacrifice of self-interest, although he dose not directly state this in his
work. He argues that in a capitalist society, everyone competes with each other and
people tend to be egoistic to survive; in contrast, in a communist society everyone can
dedicate oneself to others, that is, in a communist society everyone can sacrifice
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self-interest for others. Marx’s comparison between a capitalist society and a
communist society indicates that he agrees with Aristotle that self-sacrifice is valuable
and good for human beings. However, because Marx rejects morality and virtue, he
would not identify self-sacrifice as a virtue as Aristotle does. Instead, Marx believes
that sacrifice self-interest for all is natural in a communist society; people do not need
to struggle with their resistance to sacrifice, which resides in human nature.
Aristotle disagrees with Marx that everyone can dedicate oneself to all. For
Aristotle, only few people, such as philosophers, can be only concerned for others’
interests without considering one’s own. This difference is related to their conceptions
of private property. For Aristotle, private property should be kept for a good
management of a state; while for Marx, private property should be abolished to
constitute a communist society. In a society based on private property, one’s sacrifice
of self-interest may make oneself disadvantaged, because this sacrifice usually
benefits others rather than oneself. For instance, if I have five dollars, and you have
five dollars as well, if I sacrifice my self-interest by giving you my five dollars
without any compensation from you, then, this sacrifice benefits you rather than me
because it increases your money by reducing mine. If someone continues to sacrifice
self-interest in this way, then one may find difficulties in maintaining one’s own life,
especially when others refuse to sacrifice their self-interest to help this person. If one
hardly maintains one’s own life, how could one have a happy life? In this sense,
Aristotle insists that sacrifice of self-interest, though as noble as it is, may not always
lead to happiness. For Aristotle, it is natural for one to first act in the interest in self
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and few people would always sacrifice for others without first considering
self-interest.
In contrast, according to Marx, in a communist society, social products is
managed and distributed on a communal basis. People in that society share social
property together, and people do not desire to possess any property as one’s own. In
this sense, self-interest is consistent with common interest. If one dedicates oneself to
all, he or she does not need to worry about being disadvantaged by this sacrifice
because others would sacrifice their self-interest for him or her in the same way. For
instance, if I give you my five dollars (suppose currency is still used in a communist
society), you or someone else would definitely give me your/his/her money when I
am in need. That is, in a communist society, people are mutually altruistic to each
other. As a result, it is possible for people in a communist society to be concerned
only for others’ interests.
Aristotle argues that a society where private property is not allowed would
become chaotic because people would be confused with and quarreling about their
responsibilities and rights. He points out, for example, a wife may decide to clean
only the house where she lives and refuse to clean others’ houses because she does
not live there. However, according to the communal arrangement, everything is
commonly shared, and consequently she has the obligation to clean others’ houses. If
she refuses to clean others’ houses, quarreling may arise because other housewives
fulfill their duties. In this way, Aristotle believes that people would quarrel over every
trivial thing in a communal society. However, Marx would argue that this potential
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quarreling is still based on private property, which makes people identify things as
yours, mine, theirs, and so forth. In a communist society, for Marx, it is impossible
that a wife would refuse to clean all the houses because it is natural for her to do so,
just as she needs to eat and drink. Neither does Marx believe that quarrels suggested
by Aristotle would happen in a communist society.
In a word, both Aristotle and Marx agree that to advance self-interest contributes
to happiness. Regarding whether sacrifice of self-interest contributes to happiness,
Aristotle tends to say “It depends,” while Marx tends to say “Yes.” Aristotle argues
that if one is only concerned for others’ interests, one may end up unhappily. Aristotle
believes that sacrifice of self-interest should be maintained at a certain degree to
contribute to happiness. Marx, on the contrary, believes that sacrifice of self-interest
for all is not only necessary but also natural in a communist society, where everyone
has a happy life.
6. How to Overcome Egoism?
For Aristotle, if one is excessively or exclusively concerned for self-interest, then
one is egoistic. Egoism, or selfishness, is criticized by Aristotle to be a deficiency in
one’s character. According to Aristotle, both excess and defect are bad for human
beings. As a result, he believes that excessive concern of self-interest, or egoism,
should be censured. In contrast, Mars does not believe that egoism is blameworthy.
For Marx, egoism, just like selflessness, is a particular social consciousness derived
from certain social conditions. Marx does not believe egoism, as that a particular
social consciousness, deserves blames; rather, certain social conditions that cause
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egoism, private property in particular, is responsible for peoples’ blames on egoism.
Given their different identities and attributions to egoism, Aristotle and Marx provide
different ways to overcome or eliminate egoism. Aristotle suggests cultivating in
people virtues contrary to egoism; while Marx suggests abolishing private property,
the basis of egoism.
Since according to Aristotle, excessive concern of self-interest is egoism, at least
there are two kinds of virtues are contrary to and can bridle egoism. On the one hand,
one needs to be cultivated with virtues related to self-control or self-restraint such as
temperance, which help a person to hold back excessive concern of self-interest. As
he says, “the temperate man craves for the things be ought, as he ought, as when he
ought; and when he ought; and this is what the rational principle directs” (NE, Book
III). For Aristotle, one’s concern for self-interest, just as one’s desires for other good
things, should be kept at a proper time and to a proper degree. In this sense, virtues
based on self-control contribute to keeping one’s concern of self-interest properly. On
the other hand, Aristotle suggests that virtues related to selflessness such as
benevolence and generosity can also be cultivated, which help people be concerned
for not only self-interest but also others’ interests in a proper way. Since selflessness
and egoism are opposite to each other, once a person becomes selfless, that is to be
first concerned for others’ interests, this person may no longer be egoist. As a result,
these two kinds of virtues are helpful in overcoming or even eliminate egoism,
according to Aristotle.
However, one thing that needs to be pointed out is Aristotle’s argument

	
  

	
  
	
  

81	
  

regarding excessive or inappropriate concerns or desires is based on his conception of
a hierarchical state. Aristotle believes that in an ideal state, different people ought to
crave for different things3. For instance, what a king ought to desire is different from
what a slave or craftsman does. What a person ought to desire, for Aristotle, is
determined by this person’s position in a state. That is, if a craft person desires good
ruling of state rather than making good crafts, according to Aristotle, this desire is
inappropriate. However, in today’s egalitarian societies, it is discriminative and unfair
to regulate what one ought to desire based on one’s social position or status.
Nevertheless, excessive or exclusive concern for self-interest is still identified as
egoism, which is generally believed morally wrong. For instance, if one is an egoist
and is concerned for only self-interest, one tends to advance self-interest by any
means, including means that would do harm to others. In this way, one may view
others as means to advance one’s own interest rather than as human beings. If
everyone in a society is egoistic, the human relation there would be terribly
ant agonistic, because others are either hindrance or means to advance one’s
self-interest. In this sense, Aristotle’s suggestion on how to overcome egoism is
practical and inspiring in today’s world.
In contrast, Marx’s suggestion on how to overcome or eliminate egoism is not
from a moral perspective. Instead, Marx suggests that to abolish private property and
to constitute a communist society is the only way to eliminate egoism because egoism
is only a social consciousness derived from private property. Also, Marx would reject
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the Aristotelian approach to overcome egoism, that is, to cultivate virtues that are
contrary to egoism. First of all, Marx does not identify one’s desires as either
appropriate or excessive; consequently he argues that it is not necessary for one to
control one’s desires. Rather, Marx identifies desires as general desires, such as eating
and drinking, or abnormally developed desired such as capitalists’ desires for
maximizing the surplus value.
Regarding these two kinds of desires, Marx states:
Communist organization has a twofold effect on the desires produced in the
individual by present-day relations; some of these desires — namely
desires which exist under all relations, and only change their form and
direction under different social relations — are merely altered by the
Communist social system, for they are given the opportunity to develop
normally; but others — namely those originating solely in a particular
society, under particular conditions of [production] and intercourse — are
totally deprived of their conditions of existence (The German Ideology, p.
51).
For Marx, general desires such as eating and drinking exist across different
social forms. These kinds of desire only change their forms but will not disappear in a
communist society. For Marx, people in a communist society do not need to control
their general desires because all the general desires will be satisfied there. He believes
that a communist society “will make possible the normal satisfaction of all needs” due
to the highly developed productive forces (The German Ideology, p. 51). On the other
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hand, for desires originating from particular social conditions - for instance desires
related to egoism that are aroused in a capitalist society - this kind of desire will
disappear in a communist society because of the abolishment of its social conditions.
In addition, due to Marx’s rejection to virtue or morality, he argues that it is not a
good way to overcome egoism through virtue cultivation. As Marx states, “the
liquefaction of the fixed desires and ideas” is actually an “an impotent moral
injunction” in a capital society (The German Ideology, p.51). As long as the material
circumstances of egoism exist, Marx believes that it is impotent to preach the virtue of
self-control or selflessness to overcome egoism. By this argument, Marx does not
endorse avarice or selfishness. His point is to teach morality or virtue without
changing what causes egoism; this kind work is impotent.
To summarize, for Aristotle, egoism is evil and needs to be censured. A good
way to overcome or eliminate egoism is to cultivate in people virtues contrary to
egoism. For Marx, egoism is neutral rather than negative; it is determined by its social
conditions. Also, Marx rejects that virtue cultivation is a good way to overcome
egoism, but the abolishment of private property is.
7. Conclusion
My comparison and analysis of Aristotle’s and Marx’s views of happiness is
based on several questions. Their answers to these questions are largely different for
each other. Aristotle believes that happiness is the highest good, and in order to
achieve this highest good, peoples should be in accordance with virtue. In contrast,
Marx argues that communism is the highest good, if there is such a hierarchy of good
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things. Also he argues that freedom, self-realization of human essence, and all-sided
development are as equivalently important to human beings as happiness. As a result,
for Marx, in order to achieve happy lives for all the people, the establishment of
communism is the precondition. In addition, Aristotle believes that voluntary virtue
contributes more to happiness than involuntary virtue, and he also believes that
habituation is a necessary way to cultivate voluntary virtue. On the other hand, Marx,
although he believes that voluntary labor contributes to happiness, while involuntary
labor causes unhappiness, argues that voluntary virtue may not necessarily lead to
happiness. Moreover, Marx doubts habituation is a necessary way to cultivate
voluntary virtue. Finally, both Aristotle and Marx believe that advancement and
sacrifice of self-interest can both contribute to happiness. Aristotle emphasizes the
appropriateness of concern and/or sacrifice of self-interest, while Marx focuses on
their social conditions. Aristotle suggests that virtue cultivation can overcome egoism,
while Marx suggests that people should abolish private property to eliminate egoism.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL EDUCATION
IN MAINLAND CHINA
In this chapter, I propose that it is worthy of us Chinese educators to reexamine
moral education in Mainland China, the teaching of happiness in particular, in light of
Aristotle and Marx. I address three aspects of moral education in Mainland China,
which I believe are deserving more consideration. First of all, the “correctness” of
students’ understandings of morality and happiness is stressed over other possible
dimensions, such as breadth and depth. Second, students’ rote memorization of the
“correct” view is stressed; also, students’ moral performance based on communist
virtues in school is emphasized. However, the cultivation of voluntary virtue is
ignored, compared to the emphasis of habituation of virtuous performance. Also,
students’ moral performance out of school seems unimportant, based on the morality
assessment in Mainland China. Third, concern of self-interest is generally taught as
something that students need to suppress in order to cultivate virtues such as
selflessness and dedicating oneself to communism. However, self-interest is not
necessarily evil; it may contribute to human beings’ development and happiness.
Based on my discussion in the previous chapters, I pose that it is worthy of us Chinese
educators to reconsider at least these three aspects of moral education in Mainland
China.
For instance, the following questions deserve some exploration:
Do we really want the only “correct” view of happiness to be taught in school?
Why and why not? If not, what are the possible ways for educators and teachers to
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include other views of happiness into morality courses? What might we have missed,
if we teachers and educators focus mainly on students’ moral performance in school
and rote memorization of the “correct” view? How might we teach students to balance
advancement and sacrifice of self-interest, which both may lead to happiness? My
following discussion is kept in the same framework as in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3,
from teaching of happiness in general, to voluntary virtue, and then to the teaching of
self-interest.
1. A Comprehensive Understanding of Happiness vs. the “Correct” One
In Mainland China, the Marxist view of happiness is taught as the only “correct”
view of happiness. Students are taught that communism is the highest good of human
beings; a really happy life for all the people only exists in a communist society.
Additionally, in order to achieve happiness, everyone should dedicate oneself to
communism. However, it may be too assertive to claim that only one view of
happiness is correct, because every theory may contain both correctness or plausibility
and deficiencies or incompleteness. For instance, Marx rejects the connection between
happiness and morality and virtue, while Aristotle insists on this connection. Based on
my previous discussion in Chapter 4, they both make a point with their arguments. In
addition, Marxism, as correct as it is presupposed , may be misunderstood in
Mainland China. For instance, the concern of self-interest is treated as egoism in the
Chinese context, and the censure on self-interest, according to the government, is
based on Marxism. However, Marx himself does not directly criticize self-interest or
even egoism in his work. Moreover, it may narrow down students’ vision to view
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happiness by teaching them only one “correct” view. Also, it would be problematic to
identify different views of happiness as either correct or incorrect. Correctness or
incorrectness may not be a good standard, or at least not the only appropriate one, to
evaluate ethical theories.
Given all these potential problems caused by teaching Marxism as the only
“correct” view, I argue that it would be worthy of us educators to redesign morality
courses based on a comprehensive understanding of happiness in order to improve our
teaching practice.
a) A comprehensive understanding of happiness involves more than one
view of happiness.
Many scholars and philosophers provide valuable thoughts regarding happiness,
besides Marx and Aristotle. For instance, for utilitarians, happiness is to maximize
pleasure for the most people while minimize pains. This view seems to make a point,
because in some cases happiness for all is hardly achieved based on Aristotle’s or
Marx’s views. For instance, in a non-communist society, happiness for all is
impossible, according to Marx. In this kind of society, some people tend to be
unhappy anyhow, even though they are following moral principles and trying to be
virtuous. It is arguable why someone is unhappy anyway, but utilitarians make a point
here by attempting to maximize happiness for the most people. In addition, for
Kantians, happiness is not necessarily related to morality or virtue. This argument
does not suggest that Kantians disregard happiness; rather, Kantians doubt that moral
principles created by human beings always represent the truth. In this sense, Kantians
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agree with Marx that when moral principles are not the truth or really good, they lead
to evil rather than happiness. Kantians also make a legitimate point because when
ruling class uses morality as a means of ruling, moral principles may not be the truth
and may cause unhappiness.
It is impossible to find an irrefutable view regarding happiness because human
lives and ethical issues are complicated. Furthermore, contention between different
ethical views may contribute to the enrichment of either view, and also it may
contribute to the development of ethical philosophy. Given the complexity of our
lives and ethical situations, it is worthy of us Chinese educators to involve more than
one view of morality or happiness in class rather than focusing on only the Marxist
view. However, since there are so many valuable and inspiring views of happiness, it
may be difficult to decide which views are better than others to be included. Due to
this reason, I am not going to suggest several views over others here.
However, I suggest that perhaps teachers can pay more attention to those theories,
which focus on happiness of individuals, or theories which focus on both happiness of
individuals and a society, as the Aristotelian one. This argument is based on my
observation of moral education in Mainland China, which focuses largely on
happiness of the country or the society. That is, individuals seem to be the means to
realize the happiness of the country rather than the end, and individuals’ happiness is
largely ignored there. However, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, individuals
contribute to the happiness of a state; at the same time, individuals’ happiness is also
the end that people pursue. As a result, both happiness of individuals and happiness of
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a state may deserve considerations. In this sense, I suggest it is worthy of considering
theories of happiness which focus on not only society-orientedness but also
individual-orientedness, such as the Aristotelian view of happiness.
Considering the political atmosphere in Mainland China, it may not be practical
to urge the government to include other views besides Marxism in morality textbooks.
That is, morality textbooks are still based on the only “correct” view there. However,
it is possible for teachers to introduce students to several views of happiness besides
Marxism. Teachers’ selection of different views may be based on several factors, such
as teachers’ own thinking of different views, teaching content, and schools’ tolerance
to different views. Also, teachers may try to avoid imposing the “correctness” and
irrefutableness of Marxism on students. Moreover, teachers may allow some
arguments regarding Marxism, though it may be very challenging for teachers in
Mainland China.
b) Families and communities may be invited to contribute to a
comprehensive understanding of happiness.
A comprehensive understanding of happiness may also urge us Chinese
educators to invite parents and communities to participate in the redesign of morality
curriculum. Under the guidance of the only “correct” view of happiness and morality
in Mainland China, school (as the branch of the government) is the only authority to
teach morality or happiness. If parents hold different views other than the “correct”
one, then parents are viewed as a hindrance to moral education. However, morality is
not only a subject matter taught in school; rather, students may encounter moral issues
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every day and everywhere, in and out of school. Also, parents’ different views may
not be incorrect views; neither would their views necessarily hinder moral education.
Rather, parents and communities may also be a valuable source to teach morality;
consequently, it is worthy of us to think about ways to invite them into moral
curriculum rather than ruling them out.
For instance, the following assignments might be helpful in intriguing students’
exploration of happiness and also involving the participation of parents and other
people. Teachers may ask students to interview several people including parents,
other family members, neighbors and strangers on “What is happiness to you?” Also,
teachers may encourage students to compare these answers with students’ own
answers, “Are they the same?” “Why or Why not?” “Which answer(s) is/are the one(s)
that interest you the most?” This kind of exploration may inspire students’ own
thinking of happiness and may contribute their comprehensive understandings of
happiness.
2. It Is Worthy to Reconsider the Way We Teach and Assess Morality or Virtue
in Mainland China.
In Mainland China, the emphasis of the only “correct” view of happiness and
morality affects the ways that happiness and morality are taught and assessed there.
Teachers lecture on happiness and morality, based on morality textbooks. Students’
arguments or challenges to the “correct” view are not encouraged or even allowed.
Students’ rote memorization of the “correct” view is tested, and their test scores are
the components of their moral report. Also, students’ virtuous behaviors in school are
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observed and evaluated by teachers; it is necessary for students to perform virtuous
actions in order to have a good moral reports. The way that morality is taught and
assessed in Mainland China implies that schools only focus on habituating students to
“correct” morality memorization and virtuous actions in school.
However, this kind of habituation does not necessarily result in the cultivation of
voluntary virtue in students in Mainland China. That is, students may exhibit virtuous
actions and “correct” virtuous knowledge without being virtuous. Voluntary virtue,
according to Aristotle, is the goal of moral education, but voluntariness in students’
virtuous actions is neglected in Mainland China, in both teaching practices and
government guidance documents. For instance, in official educational documents,
voluntariness is seldom addressed. It seems to the government that voluntariness is
insignificant; rather, the government assumes that students will definitely possess the
communist virtues if the students are imposed with these virtues and are habituated to
behaviors based on these virtues. In addition, voluntariness is also ignored in
educational practices. For example, many schools apply forced donation as an
approach for arousing and cultivating virtues such as fraternal love, benevolence, and
kindness. In this particular educational practice, little attention is paid to students’
voluntariness to donate. Let us explore this example in detail to see how voluntariness
in students’ virtuous behaviors is ignored.
It is very common in Mainland China that individuals and enterprises are
required by the government to donate when serious disasters or accidents (such as
earthquakes or train collisions) occur. For many employees in the government,
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schools, and any other state-owned enterprises, the donation is a direct deduction of
their salary. For students, they are usually urged or even required by teachers to
donate a certain amount of money. In some schools, a minimum donation would be
suggested or implied by teachers. In general, the donor’s name and the amount of
donation are posted publicly as an honor to the donors, individually and/or as a certain
group. The goal of this kind of forced donation, according to the government, besides
to help people in need, is to arouse people’s fraternal love to each other, and to
cultivate the kindness or benevolence to help each other. Usually, students’
engagement in a forced donation is viewed by teachers as an indication of their
morality. As a result, students may donate, though involuntarily or reluctantly, in
order to gain a good score in their moral assessments. Since students donate
involuntarily, forced donation may fail to cultivate voluntary virtue in students.
Based on Aristotle’s argument on voluntary virtue, he would suggest a cautious
attitude towards forced donation, a particular means of habituation. First of all, for
Aristotle, habituation can cultivate both virtue and vice in people. Through forced
donation, students’ resistance to being forced to do something, even to do the good
deeds, may be intensified. Consequently, it is possible that students also resist certain
virtues, such as fraternal love or sacrifice that are bonded with forced donation, due to
students’ resistance to forced donation. That is, rather than being habituated to be
virtuous, students may possess some unacceptable character traits contrary to these
virtues. In this sense, forced donation may not be a good approach to cultivate
voluntary virtue. In addition, because forced donation always involves external forces,
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many students are moved by external moving principles rather than a moving
principle in a person. According to Aristotle, voluntary virtue is based on moving
principles in a person. In this sense, it may deserve some considerations on how to
replace external moving principles with internal ones when applying forced donation,
which is an issue that attracts little attention in Mainland China.
As a result, maybe it is time to ask ourselves, “What do we want students to gain
through moral education?” “Do we want students to provide the ‘correct’ answers like
a repeating machine without processing them?” “Do we want students to exercise
virtuous actions without being virtuous?” Or, “Do we care about students’ virtuous
performance out of school?” If we Chinese educators have opportunities to think
about these questions, we might find potential problems in our teaching approaches
and assessments of morality. Considering the political atmospheres and the
test-oriented educational system in Mainland China, it may be very difficult to change
teaching approaches and assessments of moral education from top to bottom.
However, there is some possible space that teachers can make towards improvement.
For instance, rather than focusing on rote memorization of “correct” morality,
teachers may encourage students to develop their capacities of moral reasoning
through class arguments and assignments. Also, if teachers have to engage students
into forced donation, maybe teachers can apply it in a less forced way. For instance,
maybe teachers can stop persuading and pushing students, although in this case
teachers themselves may have to take pressure from school board and peers. These
kinds of change by teachers may be limited; however, it may still increase the
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possibilities to shift our focus from students’ virtuous performance to the cultivation
of voluntary virtue.
3. Some Considerations on the Teaching of Self-interest in Mainland China
Self-interest and common interest are emphasized as important content in
morality courses in Mainland China. Self-interest is generally taught as a negative
concept in the Chinese context. Students are taught that self-interest fundamentally
conflicts with common interest; it is always appropriate to sacrifice one’s self-interest
to common interest, when they conflict with each other. Moreover, students are taught
that they should be self-restrained, that is, to restrain themselves from excessive or
inappropriate desires, which are based on excessive concern for self-interest. Both
Aristotle’s and Marx’s views on self-interest give us some clues to reexamine the
teaching of self-interest in Mainland China.
First of all, rather than assertively imposing on students the idea that concern of
self-interest is selfish or egoist, it would be worthy of teachers’ considering how to
teach students to distinguish appropriate self-interest and egoism. Both Aristotle and
Marx justify appropriate self-interest, which is positive to human beings. Since moral
education in Mainland China is based on Marxism, it would be relatively safe and less
challenging for teachers to introduce Marx’s own views of self-interest to students.
The relevant content of self-interest in morality textbooks is presupposed to be based
on Marxism; however, the content may represent a misunderstanding of Marxism. As
a result, teachers may introduce to students, for instance, Marx’s views of self-interest,
his justification of self-interest in particular, in order to help students understand the
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distinction between self-interest and egoism. Also, teachers may introduce students to
Marx’s argument that self-interest and common interest mutually shape each other. In
this way, students may find out that self-interest and common interest can be
advanced at the same time, they do not necessarily conflict with each other, as
morality textbooks suggest. Marx’s thoughts of self-interest are much richer than what
is illustrated in morality textbooks in Mainland China. Teachers may make their own
decisions regarding which of Marx’s ideas of self-interest to be included in classes.
In addition, Chinese teachers may also consider encouraging arguments and
debates in their classes. Since moral education in Mainland China is based on the only
“correct” view of morality, the only “correctness” implies that there is always a
correct way to resolve moral issues. As a result, arguments or debates based on ethical
issues seldom appear in morality classes. However, life is more complicated than just
right or wrong; sometimes moral principles provided in textbooks may not solve all
moral problems. For instance, according to morality textbooks, self-interest should
always give priority to common interest. Consider the following case. Suppose a
group of people are on a sinking ship, and there is not enough lifeboat room for
everyone. Suppose everyone tends to act in the best interest of self, then how to
arrange the lifeboat? In this fictional scenario, sacrificing self-interest for common
interest is not the key point. Rather, people on the ship need to determine on what
standard someone deserves life opportunities more than others.
In the Chinese contest, theoretically, if there are communists on the ship, they
should first let others take their position in the lifeboat. But besides this standard,
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what other standards could we have? Gender? Age? Personal achievement? Why or
why not? All these questions may inspire students’ moral thinking about self-interest.
Given the complexity of moral issues, it may be worthy of encouraging arguments
and debates on moral issue in class in order to broaden students’ moral visions and to
develop their moral reasoning.
Finally, it is worthy of us to reconsider self-restraint, which is a particular virtue
related to self-interest and is valued in Mainland China. In the Chinese context, if one
can restrain oneself from inappropriate desires and actions, this person is usually
viewed as noble and virtuous. There is a Chinese maxim that those who do not have
any selfish desires are the strongest people (wu yu ze gang). Another Chinese saying
is that one would be happy if one does not have excessive desires and is satisfied with
what one has (zhi zu chang le). It seems that in the Chinese context, the fewer
personal desires one has, the better and nobler one might be. Self-restraint is taught as
an important virtue in school to abstain from inappropriate desires or actions. Students
are taught to restrain themselves from private desires, and dedicate themselves to the
collectivism.
If one is well self-restrained, one may avoid irrational actions based on excessive
or inappropriate desires. In this sense, self-restraint may be a good character trait.
However, in many Chinese schools, self-restraint may be overemphasized. For
instance, without teachers’ permission, students are not allowed to talk or move in
class. They are required to sit steadily all day long. Also, they are restrained from
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their personal thoughts, if those thoughts are not consistent to the “correct” view4.
Aristotle, although he also identifies self-control as a virtue, may remind us to
consider “To what degree one restrains oneself would contribute to happiness?” Marx,
who rejects the idea of desire control, may remind us to question “Why should we
control this or that desire?” These two questions may deserve our consideration, when
we attempt to cultivate self-restraint in students. Teachers may increase their tolerance
to students’ certain utterance or behaviors.
4. Summary
In this chapter, I provide suggestions to reconsider the teaching of happiness in
Mainland China, based on the inspirations from Aristotle’s and Marx’s views.
Generally, there are two aspects of teaching of happiness that may deserve our
thinking. One is that it is worthy of us to introduce other views of happiness besides
the Marxist one in class; also, it may benefit students by teaching them a
comprehensive understanding of happiness rather than the only “correct” one. The
other aspect is about pedagogy. It may be worthy of us to involve other teaching
approaches to teach happiness and morality. For instance, we may encourage, or at
least tolerate, students’ arguments and debates on moral issues. Also, it would be
worthy of us to reconsider the ways we assess morality and virtue. However, given
the political atmosphere and the test-oriented educational system in Mainland China,
it may be very challenging for Chinese teachers to do so.
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY
In this dissertation, I examine the teaching of happiness, an important part of
moral education, in Mainland China. My examination centers on the following three
aspect of happiness education there:
1) What is happiness and what contributes to happiness?
2) What is the significance of voluntary virtue in moral education?
3) What is the relationship between self-interest and happiness?
My analysis is based on Aristotle’s and Marx views of these three questions. For
Aristotle, happiness is the highest good of human beings; it is an activity of the soul in
accordance with virtue. As a result, Aristotle believes that in order to achieve
happiness, people should be habituated to moral virtues. Also, he insists that
voluntary virtue contributes more to happiness than involuntary virtue. In addition,
Aristotle believes that both advancement and sacrifice of self-interest can contribute
to happiness, but they should be kept in an appropriate degree, for instance the mean
degree according to Aristotle.
In contrast, for Marx, happiness is a particular good of human beings, but it is
not higher than other goods, such as freedom and self-realization of human essence.
Rather, Marx suggests that communism is the highest good, because it the
precondition of other goods. In addition, Marx believes that voluntary labor
contributes to happiness, while involuntary labor leads to unhappiness. Regarding
whether voluntary virtue contributes to happiness, Marx does not give a direct answer.
Given his rejection to morality and virtue, he tends to answer “No,” because he
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believes that morality or virtue can be used as a means of ruling. Furthermore, Marx
agrees with Aristotle that self-interest can be positive to human beings. Also, Marx
values sacrifice of self-interest, but he believes that only in a communist society
everyone can be selfless and first concerned for others’ interests.
Based on the comparison and analysis of Aristotle’s and Marx’s view of these
issues, I make suggestions for us Chinese educators to reconsider our teaching of
happiness in Mainland China. First of all, it would be worthy of us to involve other
views of happiness and morality besides the Marxist view in class. Different views
may contribute to a comprehensive understanding of happiness; also, it may
contribute to students’ practice of pursuing happiness. Moreover, it may be worthy of
us to engage families and communities to participate in the redesign of morality
courses. Second, it would be worthy of considering how to cultivate voluntary virtue
in students, besides habituating them to virtuous actions. I use forced donation as an
example to illustrate that moral education in Mainland China focuses on virtuous
performance rather than voluntary virtue. I argue moral education that ignores
voluntary virtue may be incomplete. As a result, I suggest that we Chinese educators
work together to develop new approaches to cultivate and to assess morality or virtue.
Finally, I suggest that it is worthy of considering how to teach self-interest based on
involvement of different views and methods.
The teaching of happiness in Mainland China is a big issue. It is impossible for
me to cover every aspect of that topic in this dissertation. There are several main
inadequacies in this dissertation, which need further investigation. First of all, there
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are many valuable philosophical thoughts of happiness and/or morality, such as the
Kantian view, the utilitarian view, and so forth. However, my analysis is mainly based
on Aristotle’s and Marx’s views of happiness. Other views besides the two
philosophers’ may inspire me to reexamine the teaching of happiness in Mainland
China, from other perspectives, which may contribute more to a holistic view of this
issue.
Second, I involve several of Confucius’ thoughts regarding happiness in Chapter
1. However, I do not provide an extensive analysis based on the Confucian view. A
possible reason for this is that Confucianism was replaced, marginalized, and
suppressed, when communism became the dominant ideology, educational ideology
in particular, in Mainland China. However, considering Confucianism’s influence and
its recent potential reviving in Mainland China, further work may be needed to
explore Confucius’ influence on moral education in Mainland China.
Finally, in this dissertation, I focus on the teaching of happiness. I do not explore
what we Chinese educators teach happiness for. Personally, I believe that we teach
happiness and morality for a happy life. However, according to the Chinese
government, the ultimate goal of moral education, happiness education in particular,
is to cultivate qualified and reliable “socialist/communist successors5.” Based on the
government guidance documents, happiness is not the ultimate end of human beings. I
believe that the philosophical foundation of moral education or happiness education
deserves more examinations, but I purposefully skip this topic in this dissertation.
“How to teach for happiness” may be an interesting and important issue to examine in
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